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Abstract 
Nonprofit hospitals are under increased pressure to maintain financial stability and 
compliance with Internal Revenue Service (IRS) net community benefit requirements. 
Boards of directors are not always confident that the compensation packages awarded to 
executives stimulate them to act in the organization’s best interest. The principal-agent 
theory formed the basis of this correlational study. Archival data from National Center 
for Charitable Statistics, Guidestar, and the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
were collected from 117 nonprofit urban hospitals for the fiscal year 2013. Regression 
analysis was used to determine the significance of relationships between return on assets 
(ROA), change in net assets (profit), and net community benefits expense and average 
executive compensation (AEC). ROA and profit demonstrated a significant relationship 
with AEC. The direction of the relationship between profit and AEC was positive while 
the relationship with ROA and AEC was negative. There was no significant relationship 
between net community benefit and AEC. The implications for positive social change 
include improved understand of executive compensation alignment, job creation, and IRS 
net community benefits expense requirements. Lawmakers may use the information to 
create legislation related to net community benefits expense requirements. 
 
  
  
 
Executive Compensation, Firm Performance, and Net Community Benefits Within 
Nonprofit Urban Hospitals 
by 
Terry D. Long 
 
MBA, Chancellor University, 2012 
BS/BA, Chancellor University, 2010 
 
 
Doctoral Study Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Business Administration 
 
 
 
Walden University 
May 2016 
  
Dedication 
I would like to dedicate this study to my beautiful wife Christine Spikes Long, my 
children Tré Deshawn, Christopher Wilson-Braxton, and Tegan Marie Long. I would not 
have been motivated to pursue this dream if I did not have you all to keep me inspired. 
To my mother, Carline Long-Rice, whom I watched work hard her whole life and kept 
me away from criminal activities. I continue to be in the house before the street lights 
come on. Thanks, Mom. My amazing friend Shayna Rae Wade-Argus, who always 
encouraged me to, “do better.” Your pep talks mean the world to me, and I am eternally 
grateful. My role model, my brother James Andrew Long. Thank you for making smart 
financial decisions that enabled me to pursue my education without the additional stresses 
of life. Also, thanks for not letting me follow your example and encouraging me to get an 
education. Debra Thompson, thank you for being the best mentor anyone could ask for. 
Lastly, the United States Marine Corps for instilling honor, courage, and commitment in 
me. Without commitment, I would have given up years ago. 
 
  
Acknowledgments 
 The completion of this study would not have been possible without the 
encouragement of supportive people. This challenging journey would not have been 
possible without the constant support, advice, and mentoring of Dr. Roger Mayer. I truly 
admire your talents and dedication to my success in the doctoral program. My wife says I 
need to say “Thank You” more often, so Thank You, Dr. Mayer! I am looking forward to 
a lifelong learning relationship with you. Dr. Denise Land and Dr. Judith Blando. Thank 
you both for your attention to detail and prompt feedback along this journey. Without the 
two of you serving as committee members, I would not have gained the wealth of 
knowledge and mastery of APA format.  
Dr. Freda Turner, Attorney Jonathan Kaplan, and Paula Singer, I am infinitely 
grateful for your assistance during my time attending Walden University. Leaders like 
you all are rare, and I cherish that our paths crossed. I hope someday to work with you 
all. Dr. Jordan Argus, thank you so much for the reality check and constant shoulder to 
lean on, ear to vent in, and constructive criticism. Your intelligence inspires me. Dr. 
Craig Wendorf, thank you for going an extra mile when it was crunch time. Debra 
Thompson, I am forever indebted to you for your assistance over the years. Lastly, 
Christine Spikes Long, I cannot thank you enough for keeping the household civilized 
while I studied and participated in conference calls. I love you and thank you for 
everything, including our beautiful children.  
 
 i 
 
Table of Contents 
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... iv 
List of Figures ......................................................................................................................v 
Section 1: Foundation of the Study ......................................................................................1 
Background of the Problem ...........................................................................................1 
Problem Statement .........................................................................................................2 
Purpose Statement ..........................................................................................................3 
Nature of the Study ........................................................................................................4 
Research Question .........................................................................................................5 
Hypotheses .....................................................................................................................5 
Theoretical Framework ..................................................................................................6 
Definition of Terms........................................................................................................7 
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations ................................................................8 
Assumptions ............................................................................................................ 8 
Limitations .............................................................................................................. 9 
Delimitations ........................................................................................................... 9 
Significance of the Study .............................................................................................11 
Contribution to Business Practice ......................................................................... 11 
Implications for Social Change ............................................................................. 11 
A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature ..............................................12 
Agency Theory...................................................................................................... 14 
Alternative Theories of Explanation ..................................................................... 22 
 ii 
 
Executive Compensation ...................................................................................... 23 
History of Executive Compensation ..................................................................... 24 
Firm Performance ................................................................................................. 37 
Firm Compensation Strategy ................................................................................ 48 
Firm Sustainability ................................................................................................ 52 
Transition and Summary ..............................................................................................53 
Section 2: The Project ........................................................................................................56 
Purpose Statement ........................................................................................................56 
Role of the Researcher .................................................................................................57 
Participants ...................................................................................................................57 
Research Method and Design ......................................................................................58 
Method .................................................................................................................. 58 
Research Design.................................................................................................... 59 
Population and Sampling .............................................................................................60 
Ethical Research...........................................................................................................62 
Instrumentation ............................................................................................................63 
Data Collection Technique ..........................................................................................64 
Data Analysis Technique .............................................................................................66 
Study Validity ..............................................................................................................70 
External and Internal Validity ............................................................................... 71 
Statistical Conclusion Validity ............................................................................. 72 
Transition and Summary ..............................................................................................74 
 iii 
 
Section 3: Application for Professional Practice and Implications for Change .................75 
Overview of Study .......................................................................................................75 
Presentation of Findings ..............................................................................................76 
Research Question and Hypotheses ...................................................................... 76 
Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................................. 77 
Assumptions Testing Results ................................................................................ 79 
Inferential Results ................................................................................................. 83 
Applications to Professional Practice ..........................................................................86 
Implications for Social Change ....................................................................................87 
Recommendations for Action ......................................................................................88 
Recommendations for Further Research ......................................................................88 
Reflections ...................................................................................................................89 
Summary and Study Conclusions ................................................................................89 
References ..........................................................................................................................91 
Appendix A: IRS Form 990 Part I ...................................................................................140 
Appendix B: IRS Form 990 Part VIII ..............................................................................141 
Appendix C: IRS Form 990 Part IX ................................................................................142 
Appendix D: IRS Form 990 Schedule H .........................................................................143 
Appendix E: IRS Form 990 Part VII ...............................................................................144 
 
 iv 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1. Statistics of Sample Mean and Sample Standard Deviation ............................... 77 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix .............................................................................................. 78 
Table 3. Collinearity Statistics ...........................................................................................83 
Table 4. Analysis of Variance ........................................................................................... 85 
Table 5. Model Summary A ...............................................................................................85 
Table 6. Model Summary B ................................................................................................85 
Table 7. Regression Coefficients ...................................................................................... 86 
  
 v 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. 2013 scatter plot for residuals............................................................................ 79 
Figure 2. 2013 partial plot for net income (profit) ............................................................ 80 
Figure 3. 2013 partial plot for ROA.................................................................................. 80 
Figure 4. 2013 partial plot for total net community benefits expense .............................. 81 
Figure 5. 2013 partial plot for ADC.................................................................................. 81 
Figure 6. Normal P-P plot of standardized residuals ........................................................ 82 
1 
 
 
Section 1: Foundation of the Study  
Organizational success depends on a firm leadership’s ability to create 
sustainability (Ngo & Cass, 2013). In the United States, the nonprofit hospital (NPH) 
industry must maintain a high level of organizational efficiency to be successful 
(Himmelstein et al., 2014). In an era of increasing cost and regulation, NPH boards of 
directors must be sure that executive actions align with the strategic goals of the 
organization (Brandes, Dharwadkar, & Suh, 2015). The primary mechanism available to 
boards of directors is the alignment of executive compensation with the goals of the 
organization (Kolev, Wiseman, & Gomez-Mejia, 2014). In addition to sustaining 
financial performance, NPHs must also comply with Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
regulations necessary to maintain a not-for-profit status as defined by Section 501(c)(3) 
of the IRS tax code (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2015). NPH boards of directors 
may benefit knowing how executives’ compensation relates to company performance as 
measured by (a) return on assets (ROA), (b) changes in net assets (profit), and (c) net 
community benefits expense as required by the IRS tax code (Young, Chou, Alexander, 
Lee, & Raver, 2013). 
Background of the Problem 
NPH executive compensation in the United States has risen steadily, increasing 
interest in the relationship between firm performance and executive pay (Balsam & 
Harris, 2014). Although researchers such as Murphy (2013) have identified a significant 
association between the variables of performance and compensation, others such as Jenter 
and Kanaan (2015) have conducted studies examining CEO compensation and firm 
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performance, concluding that the relationship existed but was limited. Corporate 
governance committees following directives from their boards of directors take on the 
task of setting executive salaries and determining that average executive compensation 
(AEC) aligns with the interests of shareholders (Sanchez-Marin & Baixauli-Soler, 2014). 
These committees’ primary task is creating salaries and bonuses for the executives that 
link to the goals of the organization and the interest of stakeholders (Sanchez-Marin & 
Baixauli-Soler, 2014). Compensation packages for executives are heavily dependent 
upon business performance and usually include incentives such as restricted stock, stock 
options, and bonuses (Martin, Gomez-Meija, & Wiseman, 2012).  
In addition, a complete incentive package would include a salary directly linked 
to changes in the company’s stock price (Amoruso & Beams, 2014). Although NPHs do 
not issue stock, NPH boards are under pressure to ensure financial performance and may 
benefit from the alignment of executive compensation with business objectives (Saxton, 
Oh, & Kishore, 2013). Newton (2015) noted NPH governance committees can make 
excellent business decisions knowing a relationship exists between executive 
compensation and hospitals’ performance.  
Problem Statement 
Branson, Buxton, Chen, and Smith (2014) noted the difficult decisions NPH 
boards of directors must make as a result of regulatory oversight and intense competition; 
executive compensation packages that align with hospital strategic objectives is a 
necessity for survival. Although the awarded compensation packages for NPH executives 
increased 244% in the last ten years (Cao & Wang, 2013), NPH executive compensation 
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packages are still 25% less than for their for-profit counterparts (Peterburgsky, 2012). 
The general business problem is that boards of directors are not always confident that the 
compensation packages awarded to executives stimulate their behavior to act in the 
organization’s best interest. The specific business problem is that some U.S. NPH boards 
of directors do not know the relationship between financial performance as measured by 
ROA, change in net assets (profit), net community benefits expense, and executive 
compensation. 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the 
relationship between financial performance as measured by ROA, change in net assets 
(profit), net community benefits expense, and executive compensation. The population 
for this study was U.S. NPHs that met the following criteria: (a) provide short-term acute 
care, (b) classified as urban by Medicare, and (c) have more than 250 patient beds. The 
independent variables for this study included (a) financial performance as measured by 
ROA, (b) net profit as measured by the change in net assets, and (c) the total dollar 
amount of net community benefits expense. The dependent variable was AEC, including 
bonuses. I normalized the change in net assets; community benefits expense, and 
compensation by including average daily census (ADC) as a controlling independent 
variable. Stanowski and Lynn (2015) indicated that ADC accurately portrays hospital 
size. Contributions from this study may encourage a change in business practice through 
NPH governance committees pinpointing proper incentive packages for executives. 
Social change from this study may include decision-making persons using results from 
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this study to establish appropriate executive compensation packages that align with 
company performance to provide a stable level of health care services to the public while 
improving the urban economy. 
Nature of the Study 
Three research methods were available for this study: (a) quantitative, (b) 
qualitative, and (c) mixed methods (Raich, Müller, & Abfalter, 2014). The quantitative 
methods were most suitable for this study because I examined quantitative information 
and relationships existing between dependent and independent variables. Soederberg 
Miller (2014) indicated that quantitative data if used correctly, reflects accuracy and 
comprehension of a given set of data. Researchers can examine a phenomenon via 
collecting and analyzing numerical data for both independent and dependent variables of 
a study (Yilmaz, 2013). Qualitative research involves a subjective exploration of data and 
prohibits objective measurements within the sample population (Gioia, Corley, & 
Hamilton, 2012). Mixed methods include both quantitative and qualitative design 
methodologies (Halcomb & Hickman, 2015). The purpose of this study was to examine 
the relationship between (a) ROA, (b) change in net assets, (c) net community benefits 
expense, and (d) executive compensation, which did not involve an exploration of 
qualitative data. Neither qualitative nor mixed methods were appropriate for this study. 
The three commonly used quantitative research designs include (a) correlational, 
(b) descriptive, and (c) experimental (Bettany-Saltikov & Whittaker, 2014). According to 
Boslaugh (2013), the correlational design allows a researcher to test the hypothesis that 
two or more variables relate to one another. Correlational design was the best method for 
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this study because the design permits the examination of relationships existing between 
quantitative variables. Yarcheski, Mahon, and Yarcheski (2012) stated that a descriptive 
research design results in a description of the status of identified variables. The 
description of the variables was not the primary focus of this study. Tang and Zhang 
(2013) noted that an experimental design involves manipulation of independent variables. 
The experimental design provided no benefits to this study because data manipulation 
was outside of the scope of this study.  
Research Question 
The overarching research question was the following: What is the relationship 
between urban U.S. NPH financial performance as measured by ROA, change in net 
assets (profit), net community benefits expense, and executive compensation?  
Hypotheses 
Based on the previously noted research question, I tested the following 
hypotheses: 
 Null Hypothesis (H0): There is no statistically significant predictive relationship 
between (a) ROA, (b) change in net assets (profit), (c) net community benefits expense, 
and (d) executive compensation within the U.S. urban NPH industry. 
Alternative Hypothesis (H1): There is a statistically significant predictive 
relationship between (a) ROA, (b) change in net assets (profit), (c) net community 
benefits expense, and (d) executive compensation within the U.S. urban NPH industry. 
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Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework of this study was the principal-agent problem, also 
known as the agency theory (Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois, & Jergers, 2012). Agency 
theory is a supposition that details business relationships existing between the principals 
(owners) and agents (managers) of business (Jaskyte, 2012). Kistruck, Sutter, Lount, and 
Smith (2013) described the assumption that without proper incentives, agents act in their 
best interest. Bosse and Phillips (2014) used agency theory to help explain how principals 
design incentives which align efforts of management with organizational goals (Bosse & 
Phillips, 2014). For agents to perform in the best interest of the principals, compensation 
and incentives should align with firms’ performance goals and shareholders’ interest 
(Wiseman, Cuevas-Rodriguez, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012). Thus, agency theory provides an 
appropriate framework for this study. 
According to agency theory, the proper alignment of executive self-interest with 
the organization’s interest occurs with the alignment of incentives in the executive salary 
package (Saltaji, 2013). Song, Wang, and Cavusgil (2015) used agency theory to explain 
the relationships between principals and agents. Song et al. argued that officers whose 
compensation aligns with the principal’s interest would make decisions that maximize 
organizational wealth. Takacs Haynes, Campbell, and Hitt (2014) noted the maximization 
of wealth for the principal also maximizes the agent’s personal wealth while interests are 
in alignment.  
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Definition of Terms 
Average daily census (ADC): A calculation of the mean number of patients on any 
given day during a given year. The calculation divides the total patient days during the 
year by the number of days the facility operated during the same period (Stanowski & 
Lynn, 2015). 
CEO compensation: Base salary, bonuses, and other benefits awarded to a 
company’s CEO (Haynes, 2014). 
Firms size: Total assets used to make earnings predictions based on organization 
size (Al-Dhamari & Ismail, 2014). 
Return on assets (ROA): An indicator of how profitable a company is considering 
its total assets. To calculate the ROA, divide net income by average total assets (Pleshko, 
Heiens, & Peev, 2014). 
Statement of financial position: The nonprofit income statement is showing the 
change in net assets as net income (Mwango, Makau, & Kosimbei, 2014). 
Surplus revenue: Additional revenue generated by nonprofits that exceed their 
expenses. Nonprofit organizations report surplus revenue on their statements of activity 
(Chikoto & Neely, 2013). 
Changes in net assets: Surplus revenue related to what for-profit organizations 
call profit, net income, or revenue minus expenses (Chikoto & Neely, 2013). 
Total patient days: The number of patients in a facility at the official midnight 
census count performed on a daily basis (Stanowski & Lynn, 2015). 
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Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
Assumptions 
The assumptions of a researcher are those assumed factors that may potentially 
influence the study (Kirkwood & Price, 2013). Researchers may have no hard data, may 
never know if assumptions are factual, and may not control for assumed data. Examples 
of assumptions include such items as honesty and the accuracy of information used. If 
data are anecdotal, it may be best not to report them as they are not necessarily valid or 
reliable and are results of personal accounts rather than factual research. Consequently, 
all assumptions were verified. 
In this study, I assumed that the data published in the IRS Form 990 reports 
within the NPH industry accurately expressed the firm’s financial position and executive 
compensation. Bhargava and Manoli (2015) argued that violations of assumptions could 
be detrimental to a study. If the assumptions of this study were invalid, the results of 
statistical calculations might present inaccurate relationships between variables. The 
outcome of this study includes recommendations for further research; violated 
assumptions may affect subsequent researchers examining nonprofit executive 
compensation.  
Fan (2012) noted that educational research relies on credibility and reliability, 
which increase with the use of documents certified by a branch of the U.S. government. I 
assumed that information collected from the IRS Form 990 reports was complete and 
accurate. The IRS Form 990 provided the most accurate data on compensation, company 
performance, and net community benefits expense for the year selected for this study.  
9 
 
 
Limitations 
Limitations are factors beyond the researcher’s control (Brutus, Aguinis, & 
Wassmer, 2013). Limitations are the shortcomings, influences, or conditions researchers 
cannot control; limitations place restrictions on methodologies and conclusions. In 
considering limitations of this study, I examined the analysis, nature of self-reporting, 
instrument implementation, time restraints, and population.  
To test the hypotheses, I analyzed data from all IRS Form 990s that met my 
nonprobabilistic sampling criteria. The results of this study may or may not apply to other 
industries or NPHs outside of my sampling criteria. Venkatesh, Brown and Bala (2013) 
noted that practical limitations include stakeholders and their interpretations of empirical 
research. Those stakeholders who have influence in NPHs may arrive at different 
conclusions depending upon how they interpret the results.  
Also, the results may vary if future researchers perform a similar examination of 
for-profit, government, and privately held hospitals in the United States. Bai (2012) noted 
the composition of boards of directors varies for profit-driven organizations and 
influences their performance. The existence of a relationship between examined NPH 
variables does not prove causality (Arrawatia, Misra, & Dawar, 2015). The examining of 
cause-effect reasoning is outside the scope of this study. 
Delimitations 
The delimitations of a study are choices made by the researcher for various 
reasons (Newcomer, Marion, & Earnhardt, 2014). I made choices in my study regarding 
what I was not doing and why. I identified the literature not reviewed, the population not 
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studied, and the reasons why I did not use particular methodologies. I did not examine the 
circumstances and situations in which compensation committees’ base executive pay. 
Likewise, an inquiry into the motivation behind compensation decisions was beyond of 
the scope of this study.  
Ling Koh, Chai, and Tay (2014) noted the influence that time constraints place on 
a researcher’s agenda. Such constraints during my doctoral study program did not allow 
the opportunity to interview the boards of every NPH in the United States to find out their 
motivation behind incentive packages. The data used for the study consisted of publicly 
available information. This data reduced the reliance on executive members who may 
have other, higher priority obligations.  
The data for this included hospitals that (a) had accessible 2013 IRS Form 990s, 
(b) provided short-term acute care, (c) were Medicare classified as urban, and (d) had 
more than 250 patient beds. Large urban NPHs’ have unique problems based on their 
location and size (Ko, Needleman, Derose, Laugesen, & Ponce, 2014). Ko et al. (2014) 
noted that large urban hospitals are critical to the distribution of services to communities. 
The research focused on large urban hospitals may not reflect issues of small or rural 
hospitals. The final delimitation was the sampled year, 2013, which may prevent 
generalization of results to other years. Wernz, Zhang, and Phusavat (2014) noted similar 
reliability and generalization concerns within their study, which did not address the for-
profit or government-sponsored hospital population. For-profit hospitals do not have 
501(c)(3) nonprofit status and are not required to provide community benefits (Baltagi & 
Yen, 2014). Baltagi and Yen (2014) confirmed that although government sponsored 
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facilities are tax-exempt, their financial structure is very different compared to NPHs. 
The generalization of results of this study may not apply to for-profit or government-
sponsored hospitals. 
Significance of the Study 
Contribution to Business Practice  
Boards of directors of the U.S. NPH industry determine whether company 
performance and executive compensation are in alignment (Wilkins, Hermanson, & 
Cohen, 2015). This study is of value to business leaders because it may help boards of 
directors make well-informed decisions related to executive compensation. These boards 
may use the results of this study as a basis for appropriate executive compensation 
packages. Executives must maintain a high level of financial performance to sustain the 
organization’s mission (Zhang, Lawrence, & Anderson, 2014). The mission of NPHs, to 
provide community benefits, negatively influences financial performance (Young et al., 
2013). The results of this study may contribute to the efficient practice of businesses by 
assisting U.S. NPH boards in addressing conflicting goals as they develop executive 
compensation plans. 
Implications for Social Change  
The implications for social change include boards of directors of organizations 
comprehending how the performance of NPHs correlates with executive compensation. 
Compensation incentives reward individuals for the work they perform and the increased 
value they bring to the company (Hidi, 2015). The question was whether the executive 
compensation package and business performance are in alignment to create a sustainable 
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environment. Because the board of directors must agree on executive compensation, 
those members charged with creating executive compensation packages should have 
knowledge of the accounting returns for the enterprise. The board of trustees should 
expect the return on assets to correlate with executive compensation (Sauerwald, Lin, & 
Peng, 2014). Increasing understanding of executive compensation and business 
performance could also benefit the board of directors by allowing them to use incentive-
based executive rewards aligned with company performance.  
A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature 
This literature review includes a comprehensive review of academic literature and 
the theoretical framework supporting executive compensation. In this literature review, I 
focus on compensation paid to executives in the NPH industry. The review also includes 
an expanded view of executive compensation examples from other sectors. My research 
question addressed ROA, changes in net assets, net community benefits expense, and 
executive compensation. This study includes a review of the relationship between 
business financial performance measures and executive compensation.  
The strategy used for reviewing academic literature included the use of Walden 
University Library databases, professional databases (Sage, ExecuComp, Capital IQ, 
Social Science Research Network [SSRN]), and Google Scholar. These databases 
provided access to scholarly and peer-reviewed articles and journals. The key words used 
in the literature search include various combinations of the following: agency theory, 
agency problem, stewardship theory, social contract theory, nonprofit hospital, executive 
compensation, executive incentives, chief executive officer compensation, nonprofit, total 
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compensation of chief executive officers. Additional keywords included nonprofit CEO 
compensation, agency theory, history of CEO compensation, the board of directors, 
compensation determination, firm performance, CEO incentives, return on assets, ROA, 
surplus revenue, and net community benefit.  
The parameters of the search were limited to peer-reviewed journals published 
within 5 years of my graduation in May 2016. The 334 references that contributed to this 
study consisted of 318 peer-reviewed articles, which represent 95% of all sources 
exceeding the university required a minimum of 85%. Total references published 
between 2012 and 2016 are 307, which represents 92% of all sources, exceeding the 
university required minimum of 85%. The literature review includes 211 references, of 
which 189 are published between 2012 and 2016.  
A thorough examination of agency theory, which guided this study, is at the 
beginning of the literature review. I examine the theory from its historical inception to its 
business and practical applications in modern business environments. This section also 
includes an examination of primary oppositional theories, providing explanations 
regarding why those theories would not prove beneficial to this study. The pertinent 
historical roots of scholar and practitioner analysis of compensation follow immediately 
after.  
In addition, an examination of nonprofit organizations and their history of 
executive compensation is included. Succeeding the history of executive compensation is 
a description of compensation structure, how payment calculation occurs for senior 
managers, compensation measurements, and the power of the executives. The literature 
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review also addresses firm performance, how to measure performance, executive 
incentives based upon performance, and nonprofit executive compensation.  
Agency Theory 
The research question in this doctoral study addresses company financial 
performance measured by ROA, changes in net assets, community benefits expense, and 
their relationship to executive compensation packages. Van Puyvelde et al. (2012) 
suggested that agency theory illuminates transparency and accountability within 
nonprofit organizations. Likewise, Reid and Turbide (2012) noted that nonprofit 
governance enables sustainability within organizations as they navigate through dynamic 
changes. The primary objective of the study was governance, through which agency 
theory provided the most suitable lens.  
Agency theory history. Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776) initiated an early 
dialogue related to organizational theory. In the manuscript, Smith predicted that in a 
firm controlled by an individual or group of persons other than the company’s owner(s), 
the goals of the owner fall by the wayside. Numerous organizational theoretical inquiries 
would follow over the next century and a half. For instance, Berle and Means (1932) 
focused their discussion on the separation of ownership and control within big 
businesses. Berle and Means noted that industries tend to consolidate with ownership 
positions held by various individuals, limiting tan individual’s use of power.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) established a concern for ownership control 
separation by illustrating economic influence through the theory of the firm. Their study 
identified costs associated with the agency problem, including who handles the cost and 
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why they are responsible. Means (1929) concluded that the corporate revolution had 
occurred because only 11% of the largest 200 nonfinancial companies had an owner who 
held the majority of its shares. Means identified two trends, the growth of concentrated 
power and increasing stock ownership dispersal, which resulted in grander executive 
control and shared ownership. 
Dorsey (2014) operated under the assumption that the principal and agent are only 
concerned with the maximization of their personal wealth. Dorsey argued that, according 
to agency theory, the agent may at times not act in the best interest of the principal. 
Pepper and Gore (2012) noted that contracts the principal negotiates with the agent are 
heavily reliant upon firm performance. Bosse and Phillips (2014) observed that to protect 
the principal’s best interest, executive incentives should align with company 
performance.  
The principal can also benefit from establishing monitoring mechanisms as a 
means of controlling unacceptable behavior by the agent. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
defined monitoring as a comprehensive monitoring mechanism, such as rules and 
expenditure restrictions. The principal may also incur other monitoring costs such as 
bonding and residual losses (Van Puyvelde et al., 2012). Williams (1988) clarified such 
residual costs as those in which agent decisions are different from that of the principal’s 
interest.  
Williams (1988) further argued that principals should seek to reduce extra costs. 
To accomplish this reduction, the principal bears the cost of monitoring while the agent 
assumes the bonding costs. In essence, the intricate agency expenses are the least of the 
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three. Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) examination excluded the normative aspect of 
optimal contracts, focusing only on those that exhibited positive incentives under which 
the design of contracts occur. 
Typically, control and ownership separation occur once the principal reduces an 
ownership stake by offering a fraction of the interest to new owners (Campbell, 
Campbell, Sirmon, Bierman, & Tuggle, 2012). A chance to gain better utility may be the 
deciding factor for principals selling a small interest in their corporation (Galle & 
Walker, 2014). The interest sold is so small that new owners have no controlling interest. 
An important notation to such a transaction is that the former owner will continue to 
control the company as an agent while attempting to protect the interest of the new 
owners who are principals. 
While the new owners may expect a divergence of interest with the old proprietor, 
new owners may still feel a need to monitor the actions of the former owner (Voronov, 
De Clercq, & Hinings, 2013). The most efficient way to achieve this monitoring is to 
subtract control costs from the agreed-upon purchase price (Hannafey & Vitulano, 2013). 
Noe and Forgione (2014) mentioned new owners often use a strategy referred to as 
pricing out, where a reduction in old owner’s wealth occurs from the net payment for 
shares purchased. Voronov et al. noted that former owners could buy bonds that 
guarantee interest alignment with new owners. Keeping agency costs to minimum levels 
affects the wealth of the former proprietor and becomes an incentive to maintain low 
levels of company expenses (Noe & Forgione, 2014). 
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that original owners may dissolve their 
ownership after examining factors such as bonding and monitoring costs as their 
relationship to partially owned and owned assets. Jensen and Meckling noted this 
scenario applies when the owner sells all controlling interest and continues to operate the 
company in a managerial capacity. Such a newly positioned manager typically agrees to 
compensate owners for defaults occurring because of their contracts (Goshen & Squire, 
2015). 
Business applications. Jensen and Meckling (1976) examined the principal/agent 
relationship because there was limited inquiry into large companies. The lack of 
investigation necessitated addressing corporate control as resulting from the agency 
problem. Fama (1980) noted that, while agency theory is a concern, larger firms use 
established internal controls as a means of responding to outside competition. Fama 
argued that domestic and external forces controlled by the market inevitably control the 
managers of a company.  
Fama and Jensen (1983a) examined the principal/agent concept in detail while 
arguing that large firms use hierarchical decision-assignment models. The examples 
illustrate decision control and decision management and their relationships with decision 
management oversight and firm function accomplishment, respectively. Fama and Jensen 
(1983b) noted four components that compose the decision control paradigm: initiation, 
approval, execution, and evaluation. The solution to managing pending agency problems 
with upper management is the appointment of boards of directors (Krause & Bruton, 
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2014). This model allows the board to hold decision control authority while top 
management maintains decision management privileges. 
An established compensation model and business constitutions influence board 
decisions regarding the agency problem (Saltaji, 2013). A board of directors composed of 
outsiders seeks to ensure objectivity regarding the decisions of internal administrators. 
The board of trustees appoints members to monitor major decisions and intervene when 
necessary. Members of the governing council typically receive stock options or grants as 
a means of incentivizing their decision alignment with principals (Galle & Walker, 2014). 
This strategy helps diminish the principal-agent problem. However, market discipline 
safeguards corporate governance fairness. In similar fashion, management control 
systems allow managers to monitor employees (Inamdar, 2012). The only exception is 
when the owner serves in a dual capacity and makes decisions, eliminating the conflict of 
interest that would otherwise exist. Therefore, the need for separating accounting and 
operational duties exists.  
Practical application. Numerous researchers have supported the assumptions of 
the agency theory. However, the assumptions in which the methods apply have varying 
contexts. Examples of these various contexts are a company’s equity offerings as 
illustrated by Shu and Chiang (2014). Additional examples include setting up a new 
franchise, retail product development strategy development (Williams, Kannan, & 
Azarm, 2011), and transactions involving labor unions. Although only a few of the 
numerous contexts, agency theory application to business practice are the results of well-
planned strategies. 
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Shu and Chiang (2014) noted the causes of why company size dictates adoption 
strategies that likely increase firm value. Shu and Chiang found different approaches by 
small and big businesses who place their shares on the market. Examining vast and small 
firms, Shu and Chiang identified timing as an important element when offering equity. 
Shu and Chiang noted that while larger companies rely upon discretionary accruals, 
smaller entities rely on timing. Shu and Chiang argued that separate equilibriums be 
appropriate for different approaches.  
Shang et al. (2014) noted that, according to agency theory, problem mitigation 
occurs through setting up franchises and eliminating the avoidance of duties by the agent. 
The compensation franchisees receive nothing more than the residuals derived from their 
owned units (Meiseberg & Ehrmann, 2012). The franchise bears the costs associated with 
negligent decisions. Summarily, there is a growing base of support for agency theory, 
with modern scholars and practitioners examining the theory as applied to newer variants 
and originations. 
Nonprofit. Agency theory applies to all industries including for-profit and 
nonprofit (Van Puyvelde et al., 2012). As NPH competition grows in the nonprofit 
marketplace, organizations are increasingly required to become more efficient (Wellens 
& Jegers, 2014). The governance structure of nonprofits is a critical component to an 
organization’s success. If the governance committee or board of directors fails to increase 
the effectiveness while meeting the needs of its stakeholders, the company could 
eventually be at risk for closure. 
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Nonprofit organizations face numerous obstacles as their executives pursue 
various means of decreasing expenses while increasing effectiveness (White, Lomax, & 
Parry, 2014). While different areas exist in which expense cutting is an option, executive 
compensation and auditing fees consume significant financial resources. Scholars have 
argued that executive compensation in nonprofits is excessive (Dhole, Khumawala, 
Mishra, & Ranasinghe, 2015). Theoretical modeling suggests that the contracts of 
executives are incentive based to encourage behavior (Eldenburg, Gaertner, & Goodman, 
2014), ensuring that executive incentives are in alignment with the goals of the company. 
The incentive-based contracts encourage effort on behalf of managers because their 
personal wealth relates to firm performance. A lack of effort on senior executives’ behalf 
may significantly influence their level of compensation.  
The board of directors of the organization assumes the role of the principal while 
the executive members bear the role of the agents (Botje, Klazinga, & Wagner, 2013). 
Boards of directors are familiar with the quality guidelines applicable to hospitals, 
allowing quality standards and the governing body to set goals. The board’s ability to 
monitor quality within the organization contributes to proactivity (McConnell, Chang, 
Maddox, Wholey, & Lindrooth, 2014). While the quality orientation proves to be a 
valuable asset via opportunities for improvement, there is no relationship existing 
between hospital performances.  
The principal-agent theory also exists within the organization (Frey, Homberg, & 
Osterloh, 2013). The executives assume the role of the principals while the employees 
become agents (Van Puyvelde et al., 2013). The change in roles allows the executives to 
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focus on their managerial tasks and generate revenue through business activities (Pepper 
& Gore, 2012). The employee who serves as the agent in this relationship contributes to 
the executives’ success by pursuing objectives that contribute to the success of the 
organization. Pepper and Gore (2012) noted as a countermeasure; the principal may find 
grounds to hire new, like-minded agents.  
Turbide and Laurin (2014) noted the agency theory mostly inspires the business 
model of for-profit entities. While the purpose of nonprofit organizations is to create 
benefits for the community, many have adopted the business models of for-profit firms 
(Pennel, McLeroy, Burdine, & Matarrita-Cascante, 2015). Executives of nonprofit 
organizations must establish excess revenue that diverts back into the firms’ 
sustainability and effectiveness. If the nonprofit executives’ compensation is dependent 
upon excess, revenues generated as Grasse, Davis, and Ihrke (2014) distinguished, 
executives’ interest align to encouraging innovation while consuming minimal resources.  
Executives have found creative and innovative ways in which their nonprofit 
firms can reduce cash expenditures (Büchner, Schreyögg, & Schultz, 2014). Malatesta 
and Smith (2014) noted a few ways in which executives obtain critical resources while 
using little to none of their own. Bloom, Propper, Seiler, and Van Reenen (2015) noted 
executives have opted to merge with competitors, form alliances, and co-opt to increase 
surplus revenue. The growth in excess revenues benefits the organization and executives 
alike (Sedatole, Swaney, Yetman, & Yetman, 2014). If the executives did not have any 
incentive package tied to firm performance, they would be reluctant to work with other 
agencies (Pathak, Hoskisson, & Johnson, 2014). 
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Nonprofit executives are not in the same operational paradigm as for-profit 
managers (Pinho, Rodrigues, & Dibb, 2014). Nonprofit executives use similar aggressive 
approaches to business. To compare with for-profit firms, Vermeer, Edmonds, and 
Asthana (2014) found that nonprofits use far more aggressive behaviors than their for-
profit counterparts do. Such behaviors illustrate an increase in performance. Ben-Ner and 
Ren (2013) argued that performance-based executive compensation packages increase 
executive efforts to exceed expected performance. Chin, Hambrick, and Treviño (2013) 
noted agency theory significantly influenced executives and the decisions they make on 
behalf of the organization. Speckbacher (2013) noted executives assume the role of 
agents, their stakeholders, or those who have an interest in the organization assume the 
principal function. 
Alternative Theories of Explanation 
In direct contrast to the agency theory, Donaldson and Davis (1991) presented 
stewardship theory. The stewardship theory is a model of management in which 
managers are considered good stewards and will act in the best interest of owners 
(Witesman & Fernandez, 2012). Donaldson and Davis (1991) further noted shareholders’ 
interests’ maximization occurs when sharing the responsibility for major decisions among 
the employees in leadership roles. Conveyed using the stewardship theory, which 
executives will be a good steward of company assets and resources (Bennett, 2013).  
The family-owned business entity is the ideal culture that exemplifies the 
stewardship theory (Jell, Block, Henkel, Spiegel, & Zischka, 2014). Likewise, Colli 
(2013) argued that use of stewardship theory provide significant benefits to family-owned 
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operations via lower transaction costs that increase stability over time. While this theory 
relies on social psychology, its’ focus on the behaviors of executive management 
members is outside of the scope of this study.  
Gray, Owen, and Adams (1996) noted the social contract theory sees society as a 
series of social contracts. Such contracts refer to implied macro-social and micro-social 
contracts that relate to the community and the expectations of its businesses (Lacey & 
Lamont, 2014). Greller (2015) noted the mere implication that an executive may have a 
socially binding contract does not guarantee that the executives will act in the best 
interest of the business, owners, or the community in which they conduct business.  
The theoretical framework aids researchers in explaining that the company and 
its’ owner are obliged to perform in the community’s best interest via social contract 
obligations (Lozano, Carpenter, & Huisingh, 2015). The examination of a company’s 
position on corporate and social responsibility is outside of the boundaries of this study 
and renders the use of the social contract theory useless. While this approach may 
provide benefits to other scholars and practitioners, the social implications are outside of 
the scope of the study. 
Executive Compensation 
Academics and practitioners have examined executive compensation since the 
introduction of separation of ownership from control beginning with Berle and Means 
(1932) and the separation of financier and manager (Tan, 2013). Takacs Haynes (2014) 
noted two primary sections of theory examining CEO compensation: agency theory and 
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solutions outside of agency theory. The external examinations include such items as 
politics, social associations, and managerial control.  
Horton, Millo, and Seraseim (2012) examined over 4,000 firms, concluding that 
the CEOs compensation relies upon their political and social status. Pepper and Gore 
(2012) conducted similar research yielding results suggesting behavioral agency theory 
provides optimal insight into CEO compensation packages. In each of the studies 
(Horton, Millo, & Seraseim, 2012; Pepper & Gore, 2012), the boards of directors are 
instrumental during compensation package assembly. The social status and behavioral 
characteristics of the CEOs are contributing factors concerning compensation packages 
with principals’ interest in mind (Brown, Fisher, Sooy, & Sprinkle, 2014).  
To protect principals, CEO awards include stock options or grants that have 
restrictions in which the stock must maintain a certain price (Branson et al., 2014; Denis 
& Xu, 2013). If the CEO can take actions that increase the stock price, their 
compensation package awards them. A growing trend among firms that sell or merge is 
CEOs receiving larger compensation packages regardless of their choice to stay onboard 
or exit (Larkin, Pierce, & Gino, 2012). Ishii and Xuan (2014) noted CEOs tend to receive 
bonuses and richly compensated after acquiring highly connected firms. In direct 
comparison, Reddy, Abidin, and Woon (2012) nonprofit CEOs have similar monetary 
increases. 
History of Executive Compensation 
Executive compensation is a term that appeared in the literature dating back to the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries according to Hoffman (2015). Researchers 
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have studied the factors and appropriate levels of reward for chief executive officers of 
publicly traded companies, focusing primarily on firm size and their surplus revenue 
(Cao & Wang, 2013). The interest in surplus revenue and executive decisions dates back 
to the early 20th century (Hoffman, 2015). At the beginning of the 20th century, Taussig 
and Barker (1925) provided evidence that limits existed in increases in compensation and 
how company performance correlated with compensation.  
 Taussig and Barker (1925) noted the lack of decrease in chief executive 
compensation, even when company profits dropped. For instance, Pandher and Currie 
(2013) suggested that executives are self-serving and may not work in shareholders’ best 
interest by the maximizing of profit for the company if salary is not a derivative of 
business performance. For that reason, Haynes, Campbell, and Hitt (2014) noted 
researchers have focused their efforts on ascertaining the relationship existing between 
CEO compensation and company size or profits. 
Traditionally, the CEO compensation structure has consisted of numerous sources 
and incentives based upon equity for both profit and nonprofit organizations (Balsam & 
Harris, 2014). Sheikh (2012) noted the use of financial incentives as a form of motivation 
for managers to work in the best interest of stakeholders and shareholders. Li and Qian 
(2011) noted outside compensation committees increase CEO compensation at the 
expense of shareholders. The lack of relationship associated with equity ownership led to 
the owners of corporations monitoring CEOs (Desai, 2015). The performance of CEOs 
provides a clear indication that incentives provided to CEOs positively influenced 
decisions that increased company value (Martin, Wiseman, & Gomes-Mejia, 2015). 
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While an equity compensation package tries to influence CEO decisions, guaranteed 
alignment with profit maximization does not occur, and executive boards may require 
additional CEO monitoring (Hou, Priem, & Goranova, 2014).  
The categorization of CEO decisions falls into two theories: neoclassic and 
managerialism, which explain compensation structure (van Essen, Otten, & Carberry, 
2012). Managerialism asserts that a relationship exists between company size and chief 
executive officer compensation. Frydman and Jenter (2010) concluded that, given 
increasing executive pay for small-large cap companies, the large-cap companies have 
had superior executive compensation increases. Jouber and Fakhfakh (2012) noted 
company size and its surplus revenue explain a portion of the CEO incentives gap 
between small and large firms.  
Scholars and professionals alike have attempted to measure the effects of CEO 
compensation on business performance (Zhu & Westphal, 2014). Researchers have 
concentrated on quantifying enterprise performance to the pay awarded to CEOs (Sun, 
Wei, & Huang, 2013). Other researchers primarily focused on CEO incentives and 
shareholder returns. Frydman and Jenter (2010) noted a general underestimation of CEO 
compensation because of base pay as the primary focus and incentives and their 
undervaluation. They concluded that the inclusion of all sources of CEO compensation in 
a comparison to company performance provided best results.  
When the board of directors awards stock options to CEOs, which creates a link 
between company performance and CEO compensation (Frankforter, Becton, Stanwick, 
& Coleman, 2012). The incentive packages have grown as a business profits increase 
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(Fernando & Xu, 2012), which contributes to CEO compensation packages creating 
higher paying contracts for increased risk to executives. The growing danger, related to 
equity rewards, create wealth changes, which are results of company performance and its 
equity (Edmans, Gabaix, Sadzik, & Sannikov, 2012). 
The compensation packages awarded to CEOs have nearly doubled between 1994 
and 2000, even as boards of directors have used options grants as an alternative 
(Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos, & Murphy, 2013). Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2013) noted 
that although the stock price is sensitive to performance and increases CEO equity, CEOs 
are holding fewer shares of stock and more options since 2005. Harford, Mansi, and 
Maxwell (2012), via regression modeling, determined that options be decreasing as a 
means of compensation and replaced with stock grants since 2001. While the boards of 
directors are reducing salaries and increasing the use of stock (options and awards), 
subsidies are increasingly becoming the method of incentive awarded to CEOs. 
The structure of executive compensation. Each package awarded to CEOs is 
proportionate to company size and typically have performance-based incentives 
(Eldenberg, Gaertner, & Goodman, 2015). Incentives for CEOs manifest through 
compensation packages that increase business value, possibly creating wealth for the 
CEO paid in stock (Frydman & Jenter, 2010). These forms of compensation packages 
provide CEOs with a base salary, bonuses, stock grants, or options, which fluctuate 
depending upon the stock performance of the company, illustrating the strong 
performance of the organization (Jenter & Kanaan, 2015). Many packages contain stock 
options whereby redemption must occur after a specified amount of time that the CEO 
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has been in the corporation (Krug, 2013). The CEO’s stock options value changes 
regarding the long-term performance of the enterprise (Edmans & Manso, 2011). 
The retention of executives and continuity of leadership are factors that boards of 
directors consider while establishing appropriate compensation packages (Hermanson, 
Thompkins, Veliyath, & Ye, 2012). The compensation packages is a tool of the board of 
directors to attract, employ, and retain top executive-level talent for their organization 
(Frydman & Jenter, 2010). CEO compensation often parallels company growth along 
with the complexity of the organization (Gritsko, Kozlova, Neilson, & Wichmann, 2013). 
The boards of directors’ tasks include creating packages that align firm performance and 
potential actions of the CEO, as well as package competitiveness for a limited pool of 
talent. 
Executive compensation determination. The board of directors develops 
compensation packages for the CEO (Kabir & Minhat, 2014). However, the IRS and 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have established rules applicable to boards 
of directors (Vermeer, Edmonds, & Asthana, 2014). These rules dictate that companies 
must rely on their directors and committees outside of their organization. The listing 
requirements of the main stock exchanges call for said committees to operate 
independently from the publically traded company. The typical reaction to this condition 
is the formation of compensation committees that have independent directors (Bouwman, 
2011). 
These executive boards, composed of different members, establish executive 
compensation. Dating back to the 1970s, outside directors serving on compensation 
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committees, has increased alongside institutional ownership and CEO turnover (Kaplan 
& Minton, 2012). The majority of compensations committees consist of outside directors 
and institutional shareholders who handle the monitoring of company performance and 
CEO compensation. Hermalin and Weishbach (2012) concluded that CEO pay raises are 
the direct result of close CEO monitoring by major shareholders of corporate stock. 
Reducing the principal/agent problem, compensation committees created by the 
Board of Directors are primarily tasked to align CEO pay with shareholder interest. In 
situations where the CEO pursues an agenda of his or her own and not those that 
maximize shareholder wealth, an agency problem exists (Galle & Walker, 2014). Dalton 
et al. (2007) concluded the mitigation of agency problems should include the board of 
directors performing independent monitoring. The board should retain active corporate 
control mechanisms that rogue discipline managers discovered via merger and 
acquisitions.  
The existence of complications with CEO’s pay results in compensation 
committees using benchmarking tools (Prybil, Bardach, & Fardo, 2013). The 
benchmarking tools assist in determining adequate compensation (Bizjak, Lemmon, & 
Nguyen, 2011; Diprete et al., 2010). Faulkender and Yang (2010) explained 
benchmarking as a method of comparison among industry competitors. A vast majority 
of compensation committees (about 96%) use benchmarking as a tool when a 
determining CEO compensation (Faulkender & Yang, 2010). Faulkender and Yang 
(2010) further stated that a factor in CEO pay is rising is compensation consultants, hired 
by compensation committees, using benchmarking. Although benchmarking simplifies 
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the CEO compensation calculation process, the result may lead to larger packages for the 
CEOs. 
DiPrete et al. (2010) stated there must be an alignment of company performance 
and CEO compensation. The corporate consultants hired to calculate and implement CEO 
compensation recommend synchronizing CEO pay with that of the company’s stock 
increases (Brandes et al., 2015). The link between company performance and CEO 
incentive packages solely depends on one’s ability to generate appreciating stock. Stock 
options allow compensation committees to incentivize CEOs by aligning their financial 
rewards and wealth creation with improved company performance.  
Nevertheless, the board of director’s task is to remain independent while creating 
equity incentives aligning with shareholder interest (Laux & Mittendorf, 2012). Laux and 
Mittendorf further determined that compensation committees of non-executive members 
contribute to lower incentive packages possessing higher equity. The relationship 
between stock options and company performance aligns with CEO agenda; compensation 
committees are more likely to be composed of few or no executive members, resulting in 
increased equity compensation. 
A CEO’s past performance may also influence compensation package (Banker, 
Darrough, Huang, & Plehn-Dujowich, 2013). The assumption is that previous 
performance indicates current ability. Researchers anticipate that base salary, a fixed 
component, has a positive relationship with the company’s return on equity (ROE) 
(Banker et al., 2013). Banker et al. established that a negative correlation exists between 
bonus and company performance. Committees formed to establish CEO compensation 
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would benefit from an evaluation of compensation to verify alignment with business 
performance (Galle & Walker, 2014). 
Wang (2011) indicated that the risk-taking actions of an influence enterprise 
performance result within the context of the size of its board of directors. Through larger 
incentive packages, executives have shown to take more risk (Wang, 2011). Wang argued 
that CEOs with smaller oversight boards use less debt while taking on high-risk projects, 
in direct contrast to their counterparts with a large board of directors. Considering project 
risk, researchers have hypothesized that the negative influence on risk is a result of board 
size (Schultz, Zippel-Schultz, & Salomo, 2012).  
Additional examination of board size and CEO compensation indicated that the 
larger the board size, the higher the CEO compensation (Garner & Harrison, 2013). 
However, increased board sizes are contributing factors leading to inefficient CEO 
compensation packages (Conyon, 2014). Haynes, Campbell, and Hitt (2014) concluded 
that a direct relationship exists between board size and CEO compensation; companies 
would benefit from board size limits, which help eliminate possibilities of excessive 
nonprofit executive compensation. 
Executive compensation measurements. Numerous studies have examined 
executive compensation in both profit and nonprofit organizations in relationship to 
business performance using various dependent variables. Ferri and Maber (2013) focused 
on compensation that is cash-based. Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn (2013) believed that 
equity incentives provided the best variable. Pandher and Currie (2013) noted total CEO 
compensation provided the best utility for their study. Ferri and Maber (2013) used 
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multiple regression analysis to examine relationships existing between cash (bonus & 
salary) compensation and company performance. They used various independent 
variables including CEO compensation, CEO cash pay, CEO total pay, salary, bonus, and 
stock options. CEO total pay is the dependent variable because other forms of 
compensation are difficult to translate. Using a panel regression, Ferri and Maber (2013) 
concluded that CEOs’ total compensation has positive relationships with ROE and 
market reaction.  
Lin, Kuo, and Wang (2013) also examined company performance and its 
relationship to CEO compensation. Lin et al. used regression modeling with CEO cash 
compensation as the dependent variable and ROE, CEO tenure, CEO age, and company 
size as independent variables. The data collected included 900 randomly sampled 
publically traded U.S. companies between 2007 and 2010. Using the top five executives 
from the sampled data, Lin et al. found that CEO compensation positively related to age, 
tenure, and company size. Lin et al. also determined that there be a lack of relationship 
between CEO compensation and ROE, the nonprofit version of return on investment.  
Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn (2013), Ferri and Maber (2013), Lin et al. (2013), 
and Hou, Priem and Goranova (2014) found relationships statistically significant. These 
significant relationships exist between CEO compensation, age, tenure, and company 
size. Instead of using data from a single year, Gormley et al. examined company 
performance and CEO compensation using data from 1990 to 2004. Their study uses data 
from approximately 800 corporations and their CEOs’ compensation, listed by Forbes 
magazine as among the 500 largest U.S. public companies. Gormley et al. used stock 
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variance, assets, market-to-book ratio, and cash flow as independent variables in their 
research. The dependent variables for their research included the various elements of 
CEO compensation including annualized base salary, bonuses, stock options and awards, 
and total CEO compensation. Via multiple regression analysis, the researchers 
determined that risk-taking options relate to board structuring in for-profit companies.  
Researchers Ferri and Maber (2013), Gormley et al. (2013), and Lin et al. (2013) 
focused their research on executive compensation components. Other researchers have 
focused on the entire CEO compensation packages. Pandher and Currie (2013) reasoned 
that CEO total compensation provides an adequate measure as the dependent variable in 
compensation because of performance research. The use of various forms of equity 
compensation incorporated into CEO compensation packages, total compensation, has 
become significant because of the combination of both cash and non-cash compositions 
(Pathak, Hoskisson, & Johnson, 2014). Pandher and Currie used an analytical framework 
in which CEOs and stakeholders interact over the firms’ resource surplus based on 
executive bargaining power. Pandher and Currie reported that CEOs of high-growth 
companies would have higher equity compensation regarding variable cash pay (bonus) 
and predicted the ratio of equity-to-bonus would increase sharply during bullish markets. 
Pandher and Currie use total compensation as the dependent variable, Firm performance 
exhibited no significant influence on for-profit CEO compensation. 
CEO power. A common belief among agency theorists that controllership, over 
which shareholders have no claim, transfers directly to the management of the company, 
the CEOs (George, McGahan, & Prabhu, 2012; Speckbacher, 2012). Support for this 
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assumption of managerial power is evident in research by Armstrong, Ittner, and Larker 
(2012). CEOs possessing a significant influence on the board of directors could exercise 
their influence on the structure and measurement initiatives leading to excess CEO 
compensation. 
 The role of the CEO and its parallelism with the executive board allows direct 
impact on their compensation package (Speckbacher, 2013). The CEO is traditionally a 
member of the board of directors of the company in which he or she serves, allowing the 
additional managerial power (Krause, Semadeni, & Cannella, 2013). The compensation 
committee hires local managers after considering similarities in governance, financial, 
and investment policies (Fahlenbrach, Low, & Stulz, 2013). The likelihood of CEO 
dominance over the board increases when CEOs are managing members of compensation 
committees. Inevitably, the reduction in CEO compensation establishes dependence on 
company performance.  
Board members can have CEOs from other enterprises, which increase chances of 
CEO compensation increases because of cronyism (Faleye, 2011). Lim (2015) examined 
board vigilance, another perspective of the pay-for-performance itinerary reflecting 
linkage from shareholders’ best interest straight to CEO salary and compensation 
packages. The results of the study conducted by Lim indicated the lack of managerial 
power’s existence. 
Lunenburg (2012) argued that acquiring managerial control allows influence over 
compensation in which the organization pays them. The board of directors uses an 
optimal contracting theory to determine the alignment of CEO compensation and the 
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creation of shareholder value (Galle & Walker, 2014). The arrangements present are 
evident as positive gains in the stock market (returns) relate to the long-term CEO equity 
rewards (Cai & Walkling, 2011). Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012) stated that CEOs with 
abilities exceeding those of the average executive typically receive larger compensation 
packages in both nonprofit and for-profit organizations.  
Managerial power exists when CEOs have autonomy to extract excessive pay 
(rent) from the organization via the board of directors’ influence (Garner & Harrison, 
2013). Lunenburg (2012) concluded that CEOs who influence board decisions had the 
managerial power to enable the pay structure creation, which compensation committees 
should control through governance. Precisely, a CEO’s board influence can affect the 
compensation process in establishing contracts, eliminating the effectiveness of 
measuring pay-for-performance that constitutes compensation packages (Newton, 2015). 
Guthrie, Sokolowsky, and Wan (2012) indicated that board independence mitigates 
managerial extraction of rents (pay) via excessive compensation through its governance 
and practices. 
CEO incentives. Using sample data from 2000 through 2007 associated with 
executive compensation, Elsilä, Kallunki, Nilsson, and Sahlstrom (2013) concluded that 
there is a statistically significant and positive relationship between CEO incentives and 
firm performance. The increasing use of stock and stock options granted to CEOs are 
major factors contributing to the positive correlation between firm performance and CEO 
compensation (Zhu & Westphal, 2014). The influence of debt levels in each organization 
also ensures the use of stock options as compensation for CEOs. Alderson and Berker 
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(2012) present a valid argument stating that decreases in debt levels are because of CEO 
stock options, which increase when they are a proponent of total CEO compensation. 
However, complications arise when attempting an alignment of CEO incentives 
and shareholder interest in ways that increase innovation, which increases the pay-for-
performance agenda of corporations and their respective CEOs (Zhu & Westphal, 2014). 
Sheikh (2012) examined the numerous boards of directors of corporations, finding some 
compensation methodologies in which the boards should use. Initially, Sheikh argued 
increased innovations within firms have significant correlations with CEO incentive pay. 
Sheikh noted the types of tools each board used as they provided numerous correlation 
levels for firm growth and innovation. Sheikh also found that unvested options and 2013 
awards provided the most significant form of influence on CEO behavior to compare 
vested options and those previously granted. Consequently, boards of directors continued 
use of stock options to align CEO incentives with shareholder interest proves beneficial. 
Unintended consequences can arise when the compensation committee introduces 
incentive components to CEO compensation packages such as earnings management. 
Earnings management is a strategy that some executives use to control the value of 
company stock (Hsieh, Bedard, & Johnstone, 2014). Stock options create an alignment of 
CEO interest and those interests of the shareholders. The alignment relates to the 
performance of firm stock prices, which induces CEOs to pursue wealth-creating 
activities. Using regression modeling, Boone et al. (2011) examined equity incentives 
used on CEO compensation packages. Noted in their study is the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2001 (SOX), firms are using equity incentives as a primary tool to 
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align CEO behavior and shareholder interest. After the implementation of SOX, 
executive compensation incentives align with risk management and earnings accuracy 
(Boone et al., 2011). 
With increased financial oversight and regulation, increasing the chances of legal 
repercussions influence decisions about incentives for CEOs (Bai, Hsu, & Krishnan, 
2014). Increased oversight because of regulatory changes directly influences the 
executive compensation structure. Bereskin and Cicero (2013) noted the since the 1995 
Delaware Supreme Court Ruling prosecutors have strengthened ability to target 
company’s management. CEOs can take less risk for their firms by pursuing those 
projects that have little net present value. As it correlates to CEO compensation, SOX 
reduces risk-taking by reducing equity incentives in both for-profit and nonprofits 
(Hostak, Lys, Yang, & Carr, 2013; Hsieh, Bedard, & Johnstone, 2014). 
Firm Performance 
Ding, Jia, Wilson, and Wu (2014) argued that the compensation committee of 
each corporation should arrange compensation packages as dependent upon the 
company’s market performance. Frankforter, Becton, Stanwick, and Coleman (2012) and 
Hou, Priem, and Goranova (2014) similarly argued that boards of directors should create 
incentivized compensation packages aligning with the interest of shareholders. The board 
of directors, which determines executive compensation, should ensure the alignment of 
executive and shareholder interest using long-term equity-based incentives (Takacs 
Haynes et al., 2014). The alignment of financial incentives, mainly stock, influences 
managerial decisions to parallel those of shareholders. The board of directors can 
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establish an aligned agenda by issuing company stock as a form of executive payment 
(Frankforter, Becton, Stanwick, & Coleman, 2012). Martin, Gomez-Mejia, and Wiseman 
(2012) noted ownership of equity by executives encourages managerial decisions that 
increase shareholder wealth and positively influence long-term business performance.  
 Problems exist with the idea of CEO compensation alignment with the interest of 
shareholders using stock awards (Haynes, Cambpell, & Hitt, 2014). First, the CEO may 
seek riskier activities that contribute to the long-term performance of the firm. Such 
decisions of the CEO can increase substantial risk in pursuit of compensation that results 
from the firms’ stock performance (Lim & McCann, 2013). As the use of stock 
compensation increases, chief executives increasing the business risk also seek to 
increase their personal wealth tied to company performance (Brick, Palmon, & Wald, 
2012). Increasing returns for investors (shareholders) is a critical component of CEO 
success. The executives who can produce returns exceeding expectations reflect 
shareholders’ interest (Banker et al., 2013). 
Prevost, Devos, and Rao (2013) noted CEO financial returns are highly dependent 
on the firm and its performance. Kolev et al. (2014) documented an increase of 614% in 
real dollars paid to CEOs using equity-based compensation incentives. Aligning CEO 
compensation packages with shareholder interests create a positive financial return 
benefit to the firm (Cowen, King, & Marcel, 2015). Accounting measurements provide 
the most relevant tool for analyzing CEO compensation using the companies’ return on 
equity (ROE). ROE illustrates, by using numerical information, ratios relating to change 
of the past, current, and future firm performance (Nizam & Hoshino, 2015). 
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The more market share that a company can capitalize, the better the chances that 
CEO compensation will significantly increase. Gabaix, Landier, and Sauvagnat (2014) 
identified market capitalization as an important factor in a direct relationship with CEO 
compensation, albeit not considering performance. Cho, Huang, and Padmanabhan 
(2014) suggested that the relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation 
lacks existence. While CEO compensation is excessive in larger companies, in alignment 
with previous studies, the exception is positive for firm revenue based upon the 
relationship between CEO compensation and business performance. However, Cho et al. 
limited their inquiry to Taiwanese firms invested in China from 2001-2009. Fich, Starks, 
and Yore (2014) noted performance-based CEO compensation packages fail to respond 
to the underperformance of the company.  
Filatotchev, Jackson, and Nakajima (2013) studied current debates criticizing pay 
packages and their assumed sensitivity to performance. Bradley (2013) concluded that no 
correlation exists between any CEO compensation variables and company performance 
variables using data from 2010 through data available in 2015. Bradley reported that 
ROE lagged positive relations with other payments made to the CEO and was in direct 
contradiction to the findings of Doucouliagos, Graham, and Haman (2012). Doucouliagos 
et al. determined that company performance relate to CEO incentive pay. 
Disagreements exist in the current literature relating to firm size and its influence 
on CEO compensation packages within the financial services industry (Lin, Kuo & 
Wang, 2013). The compensation packages awarded to CEOs considers firm size and 
tenure, both of which influence the attractiveness of the compensation package (Lin et 
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al.). Nonetheless, research suggests the relationship existing between CEO compensation 
and firm size is delicate and relevant to the period used in the study (Bodolica & 
Spraggon, 2015). 
The current exercising of CEO compensation structuring results from the board of 
directors aligning incentive packages with targeted financial accomplishments of the firm 
(Matolcsy & Wright, 2011). The identified financial goals may vary from year to year in 
comparison, which are results of economic conditions during that fiscal period. Also, 
using data from 1994 to 2003 from the Fortune Global 500, Charfeddine, Bouaine, and 
Smida (2011) conducted research using the least squares regression analysis. The 
dependent variable used in this analysis was the financial accruals of CEO deferred 
compensation. The independent variables consisted of firm performance, performance 
predictions, market capitalization, and annual compensation. Charfeddine et al. argued 
that CEO influence could lead to earnings management, which directly influences their 
compensation levels. Charfeddine et al. illustrated the significance of all the variables 
used, noting that, while annualized compensation is positive, a negative coefficient exists 
for current and long-term performance. Consequently, the authors noted CEOs’ 
engagement in earnings management to improve annualized compensation. While 
economic climate influences CEO compensation, CEOs can manage earnings in ways 
that increase their compensation (Charfeddine et al.). 
Sun, Wei, and Huang (2013) examined data from the U.S. property-liability 
insurance industry from 2000 through 2006. The primary source of data for the efficiency 
analysis is the regular annually filed financial statements extracted from the Compustat 
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Executive Compensation Database. To ensure the integrity of compiled data all monetary 
value variables were a direct reflection of real 2000 values using the consumer price 
index (CPI). The selected population is firm executives, of which a sample of 322 exists. 
Sun et al. then tested the relationship of compensation level (cash, bonus, and non-cash 
compensation) and structure with efficiency measures, resulting in 31 firms mapping to 
139 observations. Sun et al., using descriptive statistics and regression modeling, 
identified a statistically significant positive correlation between CEO compensation and 
firm efficiency. Sun et al. note executive compensation packages have significant 
positive correlations with accounting returns. This notation is in agreement with previous 
researchers (Banker et al., 2013; Lin et al., 2013; Sigler, 2011).  
The market and accounting returns both directly influence CEO compensation. 
Sun et al. (2013) found that, regardless of measurement, cost efficiency (CE) and revenue 
efficiency (RE) relate to total CEO compensation. The results of this study are in direct 
contradiction to previous studies (e.g., Haynes, Campbell, & Hitt, 2014) and findings 
indicating a negative relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance, 
demonstrating a need for further inquiry.  
Firm performance measurement. In an examination of CEO compensation 
packages, varieties of independent variables exist that provide utility for measuring firm 
performance (Walls, Berrone, & Phan, 2012). Return on equity (ROE) is an accounting-
based measurement derived by dividing the company’s income by its total equity. Sigler 
(2011) and Banker et al. (2013) used ROE as the measurement tool for business 
performance while examining the relationship between CEO compensation packages and 
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ROE. The independent variables used in Sigler’s (2011) study included tenure, the beta 
of the enterprise (specific risk), and ROE, and CEO compensation packages were the 
only dependent variable. The population used for this study consisted of 280 publically 
listed companies on the New York Stock Exchange between 2006 and 2009. In 
conjunction with the results of previous research, Sigler concluded that a firm’s size is 
the most important factor foretelling CEO compensation packages. The results indicate 
the relationship between a companies' ROE and CEO compensation is positive and 
significant. 
The multiple linear regression models used by Banker et al. (2013) to measure 
firm performance used stock performance and ROE as independent variables. The 
dependent variables of the study included CEO equity compensation, bonus, and base 
salary. The results of the study using data from 15,512 firms indicate that from 1993 to 
2006 ROE and stock performance maintained a positive and significant relationship 
between CEO equity compensation and CEO salary. Nonetheless, the relationship 
between ROE and bonus are negatively related (Banker et al.). 
Vemala, Nguyen, Nguyen, and Kommasani (2014) selected annual revenue and 
net income as independent variables for firm performance measurement. The dependent 
variables include CEO bonus and salary. Vemala et al. used time-series cross-sectional 
regression to study the relationships within a sample of Fortune 500 firms listed in 2008 
with 2241 observations. The results indicate that CEO compensation has a significant 
positive relationship between firm size and firm performance. However, while some 
companies are experiencing a crisis during which time their CEOs equity decrease, equity 
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compensation increased during the post-crisis period (DeVaro & Fung, 2014). In 
summary, the use of total revenue and ROE as independent variables during the 
evaluation of accounting measurements reveals firm performance as a correlation to CEO 
compensation packages. 
Ozkan (2011) and Lin et al. (2013) both use modified variables that accounted for 
the nonconformity among firms. The modifications to these studies are to variables that 
include firm size, CEO age, and CEO tenure. The expanding influence of CEOs within 
firms could result in higher CEO compensation packages because they may affect 
compensation (Ozkan, 2011). Intrinsically, CEO age and tenure may contribute to the 
reinforcement and allowance of enriched compensation packages (Ozkan, 2011). The 
number of years the CEO has held his or her position is CEO tenure and age refers to the 
age of the CEO. Lin et al. concluded firm size, when controlled by total assets, has a 
significantly positive relationship between the incentives package included in CEO 
compensation. Lin et al. also defined firm size as a measurement of companies’ total 
assets. 
Market performance, when used as a benchmarking tool, indicate the returns 
shareholders experience increase while maintaining ownership of company stock (Banker 
et al., 2013; Jouber & Fakhfakh, 2012). Market performance-based evaluations present 
problems because CEO stock incentives and shareholder stock will experience similar 
growth (Nyberg & Ployhart, 2012). Callan and Thomas (2014) used the multi-equation 
system to conduct their investigation examining relationships between CEO 
compensation and independent variables. The findings of their study conclude that 
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corporate social responsibility is among executive salary determinants. The net 
community benefits expense demonstrates corporate responsibility and needs further 
research. 
ROA. Investors and stakeholders use ROA as a metric to measure management’s 
ability to generate earnings while effectively using its assets (Nulla, 2013). ROA 
measures an organization’s ability to control expenses and use assets to generate revenue 
(Gapenski & Pink, 2011). Nulla (2013) noted the user of the calculation’s divides the 
firm’s change in net assets for the period by average total assets, resulting in a 
percentage.  
Beltratti and Stulz (2012) noted the importance of ROA and its contribution to 
firm policies. Researchers examine the banking industry regarding how ROA contributes 
to the banking policies and practices of banks on a globalized level. Companies that use 
ROA as a basis for policy implementation are illustrating their ability to produce revenue 
without overextending the firm (Colquit, Crutchley, & Swidler, 2012). The investors or 
stakeholders of a corporation are confident in the firms’ actions. 
Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012) examined ROA and relationships existing with 
CEO compensation. Their research indicated that managers who exude confidence 
generate a higher ROA than those that do not. The researchers also suggest that the 
industries in which firms operate are fundamental to the CEO’s success. The ROA is a 
factor that has relations to CEO compensation packages (Pathak, Hoskisson, & Johnson, 
2014), providing its necessity as a variable for this study. 
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Younis, Liu, and Forgione (2013) examined the turbulent marketplace in the 
hospital industry creating threats to teaching hospitals’ financial viability. The 
researchers conducted an in-depth analysis of ROA and leadership structure. In their 
sample of 219 hospitals, the researchers concluded that the cost structure, along with 
executive salaries, is significantly associated with the hospitals’ performance. Harrison, 
Spaulding, and Mouhalis (2015) noted that hospitals engaged in teaching practices need 
to manage their allocated resources and investments in fixed capital that support business. 
Clark, Murphy, and Singer (2014) examined the role by which executive 
leadership influences firm performance. While various governance factors that influence 
executive agenda exist, the researchers note ROA varies within the nonprofit and for-
profit firms. The ROA of a nonprofit firm is substantially higher than that of the for-profit 
firm. The data from 100 firms indicated a ROA mean of 2.452 and 0.534 for nonprofit 
and for-profit firms respectively. The higher mean indicates a focus on ROA while the 
lower indicates that for-profits may concentrate their efforts on return on equity (ROE). 
Harris (2014) conducted similar research that examined the board of directors’ influence 
on nonprofit performance, specifically ROA. Although a limited study, there is evidence 
that supports the influence of board characteristics. The characteristics include such items 
as diversity and expertise. The improved nonprofit performance is the result of specific 
board characteristics, as indicated by statistical calculations of this study.  
Surplus revenue. The terms, surplus revenue or net change in assets, reflect the 
difference between revenue and expenses and apply to profit and nonprofit organizations 
(Chikoto & Neely, 2013). Surplus revenue in nonprofit organizations is the equivalent of 
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profit in for-profit organizations (Hamann & Bezboruah, 2013). Novy-Marx (2013) noted 
the definition of surplus revenue as the excess revenue generated by a firm after 
subtracting its cost of goods sold and other operating expenses. Income generated during 
its business operating process is the foundation of its surplus revenue (Bowman, 
Tuckman, & Young, 2012). When completing the IRS Form 990, the accountant must 
classify revenue into the following categories: contributions and grants, (b) program or 
patient revenue, (c) investment activities, and (d) other revenue (IRS, 2014). The IRS 
requires the accountant to classify expenses into three categories including: (a) program 
service expenses, (b) management and general expenses, and (c) fundraising expenses. 
The calculation of revenue minus expenses represents a change in net assets and reflects 
the profitability of the organization (Gapenski & Pink, 2011). 
Leary and Roberts (2014) investigated surplus revenue and its relationship to the 
economic policy of a company. The research examined the influence of peer companies 
and their surplus revenue within a business. The researchers note the effects of peer 
influence were necessary for capital structure. Essentially, the company will shape its 
financial policies after reviewing competitors and their surplus revenue (Maarse, 
Jeurissen, & Ruwaard, 2015). If the firm adheres to the completion and remains proactive 
in its economic systems, they can better adapt and react to market conditions.  
The compensation of CEOs is reliant on benchmarks set by the competitors of the 
firm (Albuquerque, De Franco, & Verdi, 2013). This strategy used by the board of 
directors reflects a firm’s self-serving behavior. While this contributes to higher CEO 
compensation, it also contributes to the rewarding of unobserved CEO talent. However, 
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observations show that the compensation packages reward CEOs for maintaining and 
increasing surplus revenue (Speckbacher, 2013).  
Net community benefits. The IRS has issued directives that require nonprofit 
hospitals to pass organizational and operational tests to maintain their nonprofit status. 
The directive is under sub-section 501(r) of the internal revenue code (Campbell, Smith, 
& Hostetler, 2013). Included in the organizational test is the measure of community 
benefits. The community benefits are the amount of uncompensated medical care 
provided to their respective communities (Rubin, Singh, & Jacobson, 2013). This 
requirement is important to the organization as not abiding by the requirement can result 
in the IRS canceling the organization’s 501(c) (3) status.  
The boards of directors of nonprofit hospitals make tough decisions that affect the 
livelihood of the organization (Carman & Nesbit, 2013). The boards must decide if the 
firm should forego its 501(c)(3) status by reducing the amount of uncompensated care 
provided to the community. The board of directors can also modify the mission of the 
organization so that it parallels a for-profit entity (Hazen & Hazen, 2012). Ideally, the 
board members take an active role in the organization. If the board of directors does not 
take an active role in the organization, they may not have valuable insight into the effect 
of losing their 501(c)(3) status (Hazen & Hazen, 2012). De Andrade Costa (2014) noted 
when the governance committee of a nonprofit hospital includes a member who is a 
practicing physician; the governance committee is more insightful into policies and 
regulations regarding uncompensated care. The practicing members may provide 
valuable insight including legal ramifications, fiscal concerns, and medical expertise. 
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Affordable Care Act standards requiring community benefits have increased CEO 
strategies to maintain nonprofit status (Day, Himmelstein, Broder, & Woolhandler, 
2015). Such strategies include using loopholes such as joint ventures (Pan, 2013). 
Executives use loopholes in the U.S. tax code to reduce expenses, giving the appearance 
of better performance and increased community benefits expense (Leroux, 2012). The 
board of directors may take particular interest in the IRS’ community benefits 
requirement as it may change the business model if the revocation of the nonprofit status 
occurs and illustrating a need for a further scholarly investigation. 
Firm Compensation Strategy 
Researchers often examine the existence of any relationships between 
performance-based compensation packages and firm performance (Gordon & Fischer, 
2014; Grigoroudis, Orfanoudaki, & Zopounidis, 2012). Chen and Jermias (2014) 
examined executive compensation literature and its correlation to firm strategy, using a 
sample pool of 194 S&P firms within the manufacturing industry. They found that 
differential product firms use higher performance-linked compensation packages than 
cost-leadership companies. The results of the study also indicated a positive relationship 
between strategy and remuneration. If the executive compensation structure and firm 
strategy are not in harmony, the performance of the company is negatively affected 
(Abor, 2015).  
The human characteristics of executives also contribute to the success or failure of 
a business. O’Reilly, Doerr, Caldwell, and Chatman (2014) observed executives who 
exhibit narcissistic traits, and their potential to influence firm strategy and performance. 
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Such characteristics can have a direct effect on the ability to produce a profit or generate 
excess revenue in the case of nonprofits (Speckbacher, 2013). The executives who exhibit 
more narcissistic behaviors tend to have longer tenure within their firms. The same highly 
compensated executives receive higher direct compensation (salary and bonus), higher 
equity, and larger discrepancies between themselves and other executives. This non-
performance-based compensation creates an environment where the executives receive 
financial rewards even if the firm fails to meet performance standards.  
The boards of directors of organizations examine the human capital that 
executives bring to help determine compensation packages. Peng, Sun, and Markoczy 
(2015) noted international experience and political ties have emerged as potential drivers 
of executive compensation. Executives with international experience bring a globalized 
view on business to an organization. Those with political ties, such as an ex-Senator, can 
help an organization navigate confusing laws. Executives, executive human capital, and 
corporate governance influence an organization's strategy.  
Wellens and Jegers (2014) noted the influence of legislation on organizational 
strategy. Personal political views, beliefs, and affiliations are also contributors to an 
executive’s motivations and decisions while bearing the risk of the firm. Chin et al. 
(2013) examined political conservatism and liberalism regarding the corporate 
responsibility companies’ exhibit, whereby a conservative executive controls the 
company is far less than their liberal counterparts. The liberal executives exhibit social 
responsibility on a grander scale than their counterparts. Chin et al. noted political 
ideologies correlate to firm strategies. 
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If the leaders fail to meet performance standards, it may be in the firm’s best 
interest to refocus its programs, or change its strategy. Pathak, Hoskisson, and Johnson 
(2014) examined such changes and their influence on executive compensation. The 
authors indicated that the board of directors and the executives acceded to uncertainties 
resulting from the strategic change. The institutions sampled for the study are likely 
“settle up” with the executives, or compensate them for their risk-taking and effort during 
the transitional period within the firm. The findings also suggest the use of prior 
performance, industry dynamism, and corporate governance as moderators of the 
restructuring relationship.  
Executive compensation is also a primary indicator in studies examining firm 
innovation (Akingbola & van den Berg, 2013). Executives are more motivated to pursue 
innovative strategies when compensation links to performance (Baranchuk, Kieschnick, 
& Moussawi, 2014). The compensation link alongside agency theory predicts that 
executives’ behavior will be in the best interest of the shareholders as their wealth is also 
a derivative of performance. The strategic objectives of the firm may drive the company, 
but its innovative capacity exhibits the ability to influence firm strategy. 
Although most research has examined the influence of executive compensation on 
firm strategy, there are limited studies illustrating the influence on family-owned 
businesses. van Essen, Carney, Gedajlovic, and Heugens (2015) suggested that family 
firms outperform their public counterparts. The strategic objectives of a family business 
are less complex than public companies and are more flexible. A family-owned business 
can adopt or change strategy more rapidly than a public company. The smaller entity 
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exhibits a flexibility that larger organizations do not have. The ability to have a proactive 
marketing strategy plan provides firms the ability to address changes in their respective 
product offerings market. 
In nonprofit organizations, the boards of directors’ election of primary executives 
influence firm strategies (Ben-Ner & Ren, 2013). Zhu, Wang, and Bart (2014) noted 
scholarly research and business view strategy influence within the organization from 
different perspectives. An investigation of 217 for-profits and 156 nonprofit 
organizations in Canada indicated that active boards of directors play equal parts in 
strategy implementation and execution. The board members’ inclusion in major decision-
making processes ensures that strategies are in alignment with company mission and 
executive compensation. 
Eldenburg and Gaertner (2015) argued that although highly compensated, 
executives assume the risk while running an organization. Senior executives use human 
resource management practices as a strategy to manage their human capital (Slocum, Lei, 
& Buller, 2014). The efficient management of human resource components of an 
organization is critical to strategy and mission accomplishment. Human resource 
components within most organizations understand the complexity of human capital 
management. Executive decisions for an organization include aspects of human capital 
management (Grigoroudis et al., 2012). A lack of inclusion of human capital ideologies 
may negatively influence the company’s profit or excess revenue. The opportunity exists 
to examine executive compensation compared to excess revenue. 
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Firm Sustainability 
Kurucz, Colbert, and Marcus (2013) noted ideas of creating a sustainable 
environment has been at the forefront of the managerial agenda since 1960. Although 
executive compensation provides the basis in which sustainable solutions are born, it also 
encourages ethical decisions by senior managers. Cumming, Hou, and Lee (2014) noted 
creating sustainable growth required external financing development, governance, and 
institutional reform. The boards of directors of organizations may use institutional reform 
and external funding elements as important tools while creating executive compensation 
packages. Maas and Rosendaal (2015) sampled 490 public firms from 11 countries and 
different business sectors. The long-term and short-term targets of the companies 
provided content from an environmental, social, or combined point of view. The results 
suggested that an average of 33% of the firms used sustainable targets when determining 
executive compensation since 2010. The objectives of the executives are typically short-
term and focus on social issues. Industries more inclined to include sustainable targets are 
those that produce toxins in the environment.  
Other forms of sustainability include economic, legal, and philanthropic. To 
create profits or excess revenue, the executives must be economically responsible. The 
term economic responsibility refers to the primary agenda of the executives: turning a 
profit. Ims, Pedersen, and Zsolnai (2014) provided instances where managers’ 
performance resulted in negative economic activity for firms, because of relying on the 
ever-increasing levels of executive compensation. The resulting negative performance 
associated with executive compensation is a debilitating factor for sustainability. The 
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executives within a firm are liable for their actions when it results in legal repercussions 
against the entity. Uduji (2014) observed that management handles the context in which 
executive efficiency is at optimal levels within the organization. Board members should 
be concerned that executives are not cutting corners and taking shortcuts that could result 
in legal action against the company. If the executives take unethical shortcuts, they are 
jeopardizing themselves and the reputation of the business, creating trouble and attracting 
unethical investors (Stevens, 2012).  
The final form of sustainability is the firm’s philanthropic ability. The 
philanthropic activities of the firm can lower its tax liability; however, operating using 
agency theory creates a problem for executives (Masulis & Reza, 2015). The problem is 
that when executive compensation links to performance (profit/excess revenue), 
executives may thwart the philanthropic efforts of the firm as their wealth is dependent 
upon performance. The other item considered is the tax rate of the company. If the firms’ 
tax rate is astronomical, it may be in their best interest to become philanthropic to reduce 
their tax liabilities. On the other hand, if their tax liabilities are minimal, performance-
based incentives may produce heavy incentives for executives although the community 
benefits provision exist. A thorough examination of relationship existing may contribute 
to efficient business practices. 
Transition and Summary 
Section 1 of this study began with an introduction to the problem of boards of 
directors’ limited knowledge of executive compensation packages and their relationship 
to firm performance. I elaborated on the problem of board members not knowing 
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relationships existing between financial performance, profit, and net community benefits 
expense. Subsequently, I detailed the purpose of this study, its value to the business; 
contribute to effective business practices and the potential for social change. There is an 
explanation of the available research methods and details on why the quantitative method 
is best for this study. 
The assumptions, limitations, and delimitations of Section 1 entailed an 
explanation of the agenda. The assumptions conveyed were items assumed correct but 
lack hard data for support. The limitations of the study detailed those influences outside 
of my control. The delimitations are those items that the researcher has chosen not to 
include for various reasons. The significance of this study and its implications for social 
change proceeds the final portion of Section 1.  
In the closing segment of Section 1 is the review of the professional and academic 
literature. This review began with a detailed history of agency theory, the guiding theory 
for this study, as well as two alternative theories and reasons why they were not sufficient 
for this study. I explored executive compensation, its history and its application to 
business practices in 2015. The literature review leads to firm performance, which may or 
may not relate to the compensation packages awarded to executives. The literature review 
provided an overview of the executive compensation topic as well as its weaknesses, 
which I used to justify this topic.  
In section 2 of this study, I described the primary elements of this research project 
such as my role as a researcher, the research method & design, maintaining an ethical 
study, and the techniques for data collection, analysis, and maintaining study validity. In 
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Section 3 of this study, I provided an additional overview of the study before I presented 
the findings. I conveyed the findings to professional practice and implementation for 
social change. The final portion of Section 3 includes my recommendation for action, 
future studies, reflections and study conclusions. 
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Section 2: The Project 
In the context of academic research, there is continual interest in the salaries of 
executives and their relationships with organizational strategies (Hermalin & Weisbach, 
2012). The strategies used to optimize administrative agendas are products of a board of 
directors, which implements performance-based compensation initiatives. An incentive 
package correctly aligned with shareholder interest in for-profit organizations rewards 
executives who produce positive financial results for their respective company (Sigler, 
2011). The results of this research may be useful to boards of directors of NPHs to 
recognize relationships existing between ROA, change in net assets, net community 
benefits expense, and executive compensation in NPHs. In this section of the study, I 
address important issues along with research design and method. 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the 
relationship between financial performance as measured by ROA, change in net assets 
(profit), net community benefits expense, and executive compensation. The population 
for this study was U.S. NPHs that met the following criteria: (a) provide short-term acute 
care, (b) classified as urban by Medicare, and (c) have more than 250 patient beds. The 
independent variables for this study included (a) financial performance as measured by 
ROA, (b) net profit as measured by the change in net assets, and (c) the total dollar 
amount of net community benefits expense. The dependent variable was AEC, including 
bonuses. I normalized the change in net assets, community benefits expense, and 
compensation by including ADC as a controlling independent variable. Stanowski and 
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Lynn (2015) indicated that ADC accurately portrays hospital size. Contributions from 
this study may encourage a change in business practice through NPH governance 
committees pinpointing proper incentive packages for executives. Social change from 
this study may include decision-making persons using the results to establish appropriate 
executive compensation packages that align with company performance to provide a 
stable level of health care services to the public while improving the urban economy. 
Role of the Researcher 
The role of the researcher in the data collection process is to collect and analyze 
data to draw conclusions (Szyjka, 2012). My experience with the subject was minimal. 
Although I was familiar with accounting terms and concepts, I had not worked in the 
NPH industry. Researchers need to remain unbiased and address possible ethical 
dilemmas before they arise (Pickard, 2013). A researcher needs to be conscious of 
potential ethical dilemmas while conducting research (Halse & Honey, 2014; Laukkanen, 
Suhonen, & Leino-Kilpi, 2015). To assist in this goal, the Belmont Report (1979) 
provided guidelines that researchers must adhere to while conducting research on human 
subjects. I used secondary, nonhuman data for this study; the requirements of the 
Belmont Report did not apply to my research. 
Participants 
Similar to Boyer, Gardner, and Schweikhart (2012), I used publicly available 
secondary data for this study. Although the Belmont Report (1976) noted respect for 
persons, beneficence, and justice when using human participants, I did not use human 
participants. I did remain mindful of the Belmont Report’s requirements in the event 
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human contact did occur. Schulman et al. (2013) noted that secondary data provides 
utility to researchers for various subjects because of its accessibility. Fanning (2014) 
noted that researchers save time when using secondary data. I used secondary data in an 
electronic format that was available from National Center for Charitable Statistics 
(NCCS).  
Research Method and Design 
Academic researchers may choose from three types of methods while conducting 
their inquiry: (a) qualitative, (b) quantitative, and (c) mixed-methods (Raich et al., 2014). 
Gioia et al. (2012) noted that although each method requires different forms of samples 
and data, researchers use the most appropriate method that addresses their research 
questions. For this study, I chose the quantitative method because the specific business 
problem, purpose statement, and research question addressed a quantitative relationship. 
Also, I was interested in quantitative data.  
Method 
Hannes, Heyvaert, Slegers, Vandenbrande, and Van Nuland (2015) described 
qualitative research as exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups 
ascribe to a social or human problem. Gioia et al. (2012) noted that qualitative research 
methods are exploratory tools researchers used to gain an understanding of underlying 
reasons, opinions, and motivations. Qualitative research methods provide maximized 
utility for investigators seeking to explore participants’ points of view (Wilson et al., 
2014). Santos, Black, and Sandelowski (2014) noted that qualitative research requires 
human participants. I used numerical data generated by humans for this study and did not 
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attempt to understand how individuals or groups interpret executive compensation. For 
that reason, I found no utility in the qualitative research method.  
The mixed-methods approach provides researchers the tools needed to gain an 
understanding of a phenomenon while simultaneously allowing quantification (Boeije, 
Van Wesel, & Slagt, 2012). Mixed methods research combines both qualitative and 
quantitative methods (Halcomb & Hickman, 2015). Venkatesh et al. (2013) indicated that 
mixed methods allow investigators to examine a phenomenon while collecting supporting 
data. The results of the mixed methods study may provide subjectivity and objectivity 
simultaneously argued Venkatesh et al. Due to the cost of attendance at Walden 
University and my time constraints because of diminishing financial support for higher 
education; I did not find any utility using the mixed methods research design.  
Roos, Thakas, Sultan, Leeuw, and Paulus (2014) noted that quantitative research 
enables researchers to examine numerical data. Similar to Hammer and Berland (2014), I 
sought to quantify the relationship between a set of variables. Similar to Zuo and Xing 
(2014), I used the quantitative research method to test my hypothesis. The quantitative 
method was ideal for this study because quantitative data is less detailed than qualitative 
or mixed-methods. Additionally, quantitative research designs are not reliant upon 
responses from participants.  
Research Design 
Hagger and Lyszczynska (2014) argued that the links between all elements of 
research are products of the design. Vannest and Ninci (2015) identified three available 
quantitative designs: (a) experimental, (b) descriptive and (c) correlational. Simons, 
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Smith, and White (2014) noted that experimental designs involve the manipulation of 
variables to measure change. Huang, Liu, Song, and Keyal (2014) noted that 
experimental research designs are susceptible to human error. I did not manipulate any 
data; therefore, I found no utility in the experimental design.  
Tastan et al. (2014) noted that descriptive designs are useful when observing, 
describing, or documenting. Tonetti and Palmer (2012) and Ploutz-Snyder, Fielder, and 
Feiveson (2014) argued that descriptive research is useful to identify the mean, mode, 
and standard deviation. I did not observe, describe, or document; therefore, I found no 
use for the descriptive design. I did not seek to understand the descriptions of variables. 
Zuo and Xing (2014) noted that researchers use correlational studies to examine 
relationships between two or more variables. Schoenbaum, Esber, and Iordanova (2013) 
noted that correlational research enables researchers to measure the intensity of 
relationships among variables. Hasan, Bègue, Scharkow, and Bushman (2013) suggested 
that correlational designs are intricate in examining issues not addressed during 
experiments. Because I examined secondary numerical data, the correlational design was 
most beneficial to this study. 
Population and Sampling 
The population for this study was U.S. NPHs that met the following criteria: (a) 
provide short-term acute care, (b) classified as urban by Medicare, and (c) have more 
than 250 patient beds. This population demonstrated alignment with the overarching 
research question addressing the relationship between urban U.S. NPH financial 
performance as measured by ROA, change in net assets (profit), net community benefits 
61 
 
 
expense, and executive compensation. Durand (2013) and Landau and Stahl (2013) noted 
that an appropriate sample size is important to produce valid results. 
To have a controllable sample like the one used by Bhatta, Karki, and Aryal 
(2015), I used a nonprobabilistic purposive sampling technique. Milroy, Wyrick, Bibeau, 
Strack, and Davis (2012) noted that nonprobability sampling does not involve random 
selection. Barratt, Ferris, and Lenton (2014) described purposive sampling as a method 
that allows the rejection of data that does not fit a particular profile. Barratt and Lenton 
(2014) asserted that nonprobability sampling allows researchers to use various criteria to 
create manageable samples while being cost efficient. Barratt et al. noted the primary 
advantage of using nonprobability sampling is that there is no need for generalization as a 
sample may not truly exemplify the generalized population. I chose to use the 
nonprobabilistic purposive sampling technique because I could limit the sample 
population based on defined criteria. Using the defined criteria of U.S. acute care urban 
hospitals with more than 250 beds resulted in a purposeful sample of 120 hospitals.  
While I chose a nonprobability purposeful sampling technique, I also considered 
but rejected a probability sample. Otto, Otto, and Scholl (2013) noted that an important 
advantage of a simple random sample includes the ease of assembling the sample. Dunn, 
Wilson, Nicholls, and Broadhurst (2012) mentioned the sample is a representative of the 
population. Bornstein, Jager, and Putnick (2013) noted that an unbiased random selection 
and representative sample are significant when drawing conclusions from the sample 
results. Bornstein et al. argued that a major disadvantage of purposeful sampling is that 
the sample does not represent the population in which drawn from. I was not interested in 
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a representative sample of the entire population. I was only interested in those hospitals 
that aligned with my research question.  
Using a purposeful sample of 120 NPHs exceeded the minimum needed. Daniel 
(2012) noted that although a purposeful sample does not follow probability requirements 
for sample size, the sample size requirements for probability samples provides a suitable 
point of reference for determining the sample size. Power et al. (2012) supported the 
G*Power 3 ability to achieve satisfactory power. I used G*Power 3 and determined that 
the minimum sample size to achieve a power of .95 was 89. The purposeful sample of 
120 hospitals was sufficient for this study. After three outlier removals, I used a sample 
of 117, which still exceeded 89.  
Ethical Research 
Before initiating data collection or analysis activities at Walden University, 
doctoral candidates must submit their proposed studies to the institutional review board 
(IRB). Johnson et al. (2014) mentioned that an institution’s IRB ensures that doctoral 
candidates follow applicable laws, professional standards, and institutional requirements. 
Savickas and Porfeli (2012) argued that researchers have an obligation to demonstrate the 
reliability of their study. 
Like Harrison and Thornton (2014), I chose to access the databases of the NCCS. 
The Internet networks providing access to NCCS included my home internet connection 
and that of my current employer, Case Western Reserve University. Comparable to 
Arpaci, Kilicer, and Bardakci (2015), I stored data for this study on Google Drive, a 
secure Web-based cloud storage service. The only people whom had access to the file 
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were my doctoral study committee members and myself. Similar to Skulason, 
Hauksdottir, Ahcic, and Helgason (2014) and in line with Walden University’s doctoral 
study requirements, I will destroy the data 5 years after study conclusion.  
The protection of susceptible populations is a researcher’s responsibility (Guta, 
Nixon, & Wilson, 2012). In similar fashion to Taljaard et al. (2013), I used secondary 
data for this study. I did not use human participants directly and did not require 
confidentiality agreements or consent forms. Similar to Damianakis and Woodford 
(2012), I removed identifying information for organizations and individuals before I 
assigned each a sequential number starting at one. The Walden University Institutional 
Review Board approval number for this study was 02-25-16-0436814. 
Instrumentation 
Barley and Moreland (2014) observed that instruments are items used in research 
to collect data, such as surveys, interviews, and experiments. I did not use any data 
collection instruments. I used only secondary data as described by Colbert, Sereika, and 
Erlen (2013) for this study. All data retrieved for variable analysis in this study came 
from NCCS and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services in the alphabet and 
numerical formats. Omair (2015) noted the significance of numerical data for quantitative 
studies; I found numerical data appropriate for this study. In the event any data was 
missing, I retrieved missing data directly from the NPHs website because IRS 990 
information was publicly available. Similar to Harris, Petrovits, and Yetman (2015), I 
used contact information from the Form 990 to contact the NPH and gather missing data 
while keeping information about human contact confidential. I did not use an instrument 
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for this study; therefore, I was not concerned with reliability and validity issues 
associated with an instrument. 
Data Collection Technique 
I collected data for this study electronically from NCCS and the Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services in a Microsoft Excel format via requests on their 
websites. If data were unavailable electronically, I called the NPH and requested an 
electronic copy of its IRS 990 report to be sent via e-mail. IRS regulation mandates that 
all IRS Form 990 reports be open to public inspection (IRS, 2015). I collected all IRS 
Form 990 information for the 2013 reporting year from NPH organizations within the 
study sample. I chose the year 2013 because it overlapped the implementation of the 
community benefits provision as mandated by the IRS (Day et al., 2015). That year was 
ideal because some organizations may not have completed their 2014 forms, as auditing a 
robust organization takes time. The 2013 data provided adequate data to determine the 
relationship between urban U.S. NPH financial performance as measured by ROA, 
change in net assets (profit), net community benefits expense, and executive 
compensation. 
Abzug, Olbrecht, Sabrin, and DeLeon (2016) noted IRS Form 990 information is 
publically available and includes information reported to the IRS. I used the IRS Form 
990 to collect ROA, net profit, total net community benefits expense, and AEC. Part I of 
the IRS Form 990 is a summary that lists revenue, expenses, and net assets (Appendix A). 
I calculated the ROA by dividing the net income by average total assets. The change in 
net assets is a calculation consisting of revenues minus expenses. The current year 
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revenue is on line 12 of the Part I Summary. The current year expenses are on line 18 of 
Part I. The revenue and expenses are also located on line 12 of Part VIII Statement of 
Revenue (Appendix B), and line 25 of Part IX Statement of Functional Expenses 
(Appendix C). As a means of verification, I performed calculations equaling line 19 of 
the Part I Summary. The total net community benefits expense is on line K of Section 7 
column E of the Schedule H of the IRS Form 990 in Part I (Appendix D). The executive 
compensation data are from part IRS Form 990 Part VII (Appendix E) listing primary 
executives, their pay, and average hours worked. I accumulated the total salaries of all 
executives disclosed and divided by the number of disclosed executives to arrive at the 
average of executive compensation. I normalized the change in net assets, community 
benefits expense, and compensation by including ADC as a controlling independent 
variable. Total hospital census was publicly available directly from the Center for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). After acquiring 2013 census, I divided each 
census number by total days in the year. 
An advantage of this data collection method, as noted by Leon, Stoner, and 
Dickson (2015), was that correlational studies provide superior insight. Litvak et al. 
(2012) argued an important advantage be that correlational studies examine issues that 
cannot be studied using a qualitative approach. A significant disadvantage as mentioned 
by Parise, Spence, and Ernst (2012) was that correlational studies do not indicate 
causation. 
Makwana and Rathod (2014) indicated that Microsoft Excel is an efficient tool for 
storing, organizing, and comparing data. I retrieved data from NCCS and cms.gov 
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through a request online. After opening the data in Microsoft Excel, the format, font, 
sorting alphabetically by NPH name was next. Immediately after that, I included two 
columns for the purpose of calculations to the right of the main dataset. In the first 
column, the ROA calculation was a byproduct of dividing the net income by average total 
assets. I calculated AEC by adding the total executive compensation and dividing the 
total by the number of executives. Upon completion of the calculations, I copied the page 
and pasted the values only into a new page. I imported the data into the statistical 
package for the social sciences (SPSS). I then conduct a side-by-side comparison of 
Excel data and SPSS data to ensure successful data importation. Torabi, Shirazi, Hajali, 
and Monjezi (2013) noted the importance of verifying data input into SPSS. Once the 
importation of data verification concluded, I organized the dataset using columns to 
differentiate ROA, change in net assets, net community benefits, and executive 
compensation.  
Data Analysis Technique 
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the 
relationship between financial performance as measured by ROA, change in net assets 
(profit), net community benefits expense, and executive compensation. The following 
research question sought to address the relationship between urban U.S. NPH financial 
performance as measured by ROA, change in net assets (profit), net community benefits 
expense, and executive compensation? 
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RQ1: What is the relationship between urban U.S. NPH financial performance as 
measured by ROA, change in net assets (profit), net community benefits expense, and 
executive compensation?  
The null and alternative hypothesis are:  
Null Hypothesis (H0): There is no statistically significant predictive relationship 
between (a) ROA, (b) change in net assets (profit), (c) net community benefits expense, 
and (d) executive compensation within the U.S. urban NPH industry. 
Alternative Hypothesis (H1): There is a statistically significant predictive 
relationship between (a) ROA, (b) change in net assets (profit), (c) net community 
benefits expense, and (d) executive compensation within the U.S. urban NPH industry. 
After exploring varying means of data analysis, I decided to use a linear 
regression model. The multiple regression analysis provides utility to researchers who are 
examining numerous independent variables while attempting to establish relationships 
with dependent variables (Agudo-Peregrina, Iglesias-Pradas, Conde-González, & 
Hernández-García, 2014; Chong, 2013). Pearson’s correlation provides utility to 
researchers seeking to establish a relationship between a single independent and 
dependent variable (Metzger et al. 2013). To test the hypothesis of this study the multiple 
regression analysis methods is optimal. The inclusion of descriptive statistics aids in 
detailing material relating to scores, disparity, and ordinariness (Young et al., 2013). 
Other techniques I considered but rejected included linear programming, cross-
correlations, and Cox regression. Linear programming is a mathematical function in 
which efficiency measuring occur for best production levels (Tiemann & Schreyögg, 
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2014). This method is not appropriate because I was not examining NPH efficiency or 
best practices. Cross-correlation utility measures the similarities between two series as a 
function of the lag of one about the other (Xu, Duan, Wu, & Zhou, 2013). This method 
provides no utility because this study does not use multiple series of data. Lipton et al. 
(2013) use a Cox regression model to investigate the effect of variables at the time events 
occur. This method is useless because I was not examining time occurrence as a factor. 
After collecting data for this study, I scrutinized the dataset for omitted or partial 
data. Boyd and Crawford (2012) noted the importance of accurate information when 
drawing conclusions that rely upon data. Similar to Girotra et al. (2014), I had to ensure 
that all data fields are complete, discard, and replace those items not representative of a 
complete piece of data to ensure proper sample size. Similar to Shin and Lee (2014), I 
omitted the missing information because finding out why data is missing would consume 
excessive amounts of time, and this study had limits on time because of financial 
constraints. 
Adamowski, Fung Chan, Prasher, Ozga-Zielinski, and Sliussarieva (2012) noted 
using the multiple regression analysis methods one must rely on certain assumptions. 
Type I and II errors occur when researcher’s fail to meet the assumptions of their chosen 
analysis method (Bedeian, 2013). Francis (2012) mentioned that type I errors occur when 
a true hypothesis rejection occur. Vinaixa et al. (2012) stated type II errors occur when 
the acceptance of a false hypothesis happens.  
Wakefield, Bickley, and Sani (2013) mentioned that common assumptions 
include normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. Wiedermann, Hagmann, and von Eye 
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(2014) noted assumptions as normal distribution assume random variables have normal 
distribution from the mean and asymmetric in a bell-shaped graph. Willis and Hyde 
(2014) mentioned the possibility of inaccurate relationships attributed to abnormal data. 
Similar to Price-Whelan et al. (2014) I used a histogram to identify outlying data points. 
Similar to Welsh, Eschrich, Berglund, and Fenstermacher (2013), I performed data 
cleansing and remove outlying data points.  
Hopkins and Ferguson (2014) argued linearity assumption be that dependent 
variables linearly relate to other coefficients within the model. Warton, Duursma, Falster, 
and Taskinen (2012) mentioned a common method for testing the existence of linearity is 
by plotting residuals on a graph. Vargha, Bergman, and Delaney (2013) stated SPSS 
functionality provides a means to test for linearity. If the residuals are linear in fashion, 
the data points distributions are close to a diagonal line. Duru, Bulut, and Yoshida (2012) 
noted if the data is not linear, the researcher might need to adjust the data set.  
The homoscedasticity assumption means that variance around the regression line 
for all variables are the same (Hopkins & Ferguson, 2014). Violations of this assumption 
use the Levene’s or Brown-Forsythe tests. The Levene’s test ensures that the variance 
existing between two groups are true, meeting the requirement of a regression. A visual 
scatter plot along with this method of testing ensured that regression analysis is optimal 
for this study. Hopkins and Ferguson further argued that a violation of homoscedasticity 
might produce a spurious regression.  
The results of the descriptive statistics produced by the regression allow 
generalizations from the sample to the population. Because the possibility exists that the 
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sample may not epitomize the population, SPSS calculated the probability (p value). The 
p value comparison is a predetermined SPSS standard. Green and Salkind (2014) noted 
.05 as the research standard. G*Power 3 used the same alpha and p value of .95. The 
proper effect size for this study was .15, or F=.15.  
Numerous software packages are available to researchers for the purpose of 
analyzing data including Statistical Analysis System (SAS), LIMDEP, Stata, and 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (Abdel-Karim, 2014; SPSS). SPSS is a robust 
statistical program used by other researchers conducting correlational analysis both 
within and outside the university (Akin, Gulmez, Bozkurt, Nuhoglu, & Usta, 2014; 
Anderson, Baylor, Eadie, & Yorkston, 2015; Block et al., 2014). Consequently, I chose to 
use SPSS version 21 for this study. I examined data and in the sequence of stated 
hypothesis, reported findings in a parallel manner, that supports the theoretical 
framework of this study. 
Study Validity 
Lobo, Fisher, Peachey, Ploeg, and Akhtar-Danesh (2015) noted researchers’ 
responsibility to recognize the most appropriate data to collect for the study based on the 
hypothesis and research questions. The quantitative research method enables researchers 
to examine the relations of datasets to validate the purpose of the study (Morard, Stancu, 
& Jeannette, 2012). SPSS software allows statistical testing so that the researcher can 
accept or reject the hypothesis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012).  
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External and Internal Validity 
Within the research paradigm, two types of validity exist: internal and external 
(Price et al., 2012). The external validity of this study has urban NPHs, similar to Sigler 
(2011) notation, operating in the same industry within the same geographical limitation 
of the United States. I focused primarily on urban NPHs, and the results of this study may 
not apply to the entire hospital industry. Consequently, the users of this study’s outcome 
may implement the results at hospitals, both public and private. Nonetheless, the same 
users should not generalize the results of this study to the hospital industry (specialized, 
teaching, and clinics). 
Henderson, Kimmelman, Fergusson, Grimshaw, and Hackam (2013) noted threats 
to external validity include interaction, pre-testing, and multiple treatments and 
interventions. Olbert et al. (2013) argued interaction occur if subjects are not selected 
randomly from the population their characteristic may bias performance. Charlesworth, 
Burnell, Hoe, Orrell, and Russell (2013) stated that pre-testing might cause a subject to 
react more or less strongly to treatment if they are not pre-tested. Because I did not pre-
testing a survey instrument, this external threat was nonexistent. Funderburk, Kenneson, 
and Maisto (2014) noted that generalization is limited when multiple treatments occur on 
subjects. I did not administer multiple treatments in this study and eliminated this 
external threat. 
The requirement for internal validity is that researchers recognize if their results 
are attributable to their hypothesis or another variable (Price, Palmer, Battista, & Ansari, 
2012). Henderson, Kimmelman, and Ferguson (2013) noted history, instrumentation, and 
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maturation as internal validity threats. Weeks, Clochesy, Hutton, and Moseley (2013) 
noted studies taking repeat measures on subjects over time might likely affect by history. 
In this study, there were no repeat measures on subjects because I was not using an 
experimental design. Irvin and Kaplan (2014) stated instrumentation threats occur when 
instruments change during the observation; however, I did not use an instrument, I am 
collecting secondary data, and this threat’s concern did not apply. Maturation, as noted by 
Irvin and Kaplan (2014) are natural changes that occur resulting from normal time 
passage. There were no natural changes to data and consequently, no threat to maturation.  
Statistical Conclusion Validity 
The threat to internal validity is not valid for this study because this is a non-
experimental design. Khorsan and Crawford (2014) noted experimental research designs 
manipulate cause while observing the outcome. Also noted during their research is the 
need to observe whether cause-effect relates to variation. The methods of the experiment 
to reduce the plausibility of other explanations for the effect. In the absence internal 
validity concerns, a researcher must be aware of statistical conclusion validity (SCV) 
threats (Kratochwill & Levin, 2014). SCV is a factor whereby a researcher reaches an 
incorrect conclusion and relationships existing in a correlational study. Pigott, Williams, 
and Polanin (2012) noted two main errors could occur: (a) concluding that a relationship 
does not exist when it does, and (b) concluding that there is a relationship existing when 
there is not. Numerous factors contribute to SCV. For the purpose of this study, I 
explored (a) reliability of the instrument, (b) data assumptions, and (c) sample size in the 
coming paragraphs.  
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Instrumentation reliability. Cook, Brydges, Zendejas, Hamstra, and Hatala 
(2013) noted the reliability of the collection device negatively influences the validity of 
the study. Hott, Limberg, Ohrt, and Schmit (2015) mentioned that instruments must be 
both valid and reliable. In this study, I did not use any instruments to collect the data. 
Because I am using secondary data in this study, similar to Leidy et al. (2014), the 
reliability of the instrument was not a primary concern. As previously noted in the 
assumptions of this study, I assumed that NPHs reported accurate information to the 
government. 
Data assumptions. Warton et al. (2012) noted the data assumptions of multiple 
regression analysis include many areas; two important areas researchers should always 
test: (a) that the distribution of variables is normal, and (b) assumption of a linear 
relationship between variables. The non-normal distribution of variables or outliers can 
distort the actual value of the mean (Hannigan & Lynch, 2013). The outliers’ 
identification occur by using various visual inspection methods such as histograms, 
frequency of distributions, or converting data into z-scores according to Jannigan and 
Lynch (2013). In this study, I used a histogram to test for outliers. Rosner, Cook, Daniels, 
and Falkner (2013) noted linearity assumption as the assumption that the relationship 
between independent and the dependent variable is linear. To test this assumption, I used 
the scatter plot feature in SPSS. 
Sample size. For those researchers wishing to generalize their findings to a small 
sample population, their sample size should be of a size that meets or exceeds the 
significance level as Ilieva, Hook, and Farah (2015) noted. Button et al. (2013) noted 
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studies with low statistical power have a reduced chance of detecting a true effect. In this 
study, there was no attempt to generalize the results of the study to the health care 
industry. I have used a purposeful sample technique, which restricts the ability to 
generalize results. I conducted a power analysis using G*Power as a reference point to 
compare experimental designs. Similar to Suresh and Chandrashekara (2012), I used a 
.95% confidence interval that resulted in a minimum population of 89 for generalization. 
The sample size of 120 used for this study exceeds the minimum required. 
Transition and Summary 
In Section 2 of this study, I expanded upon the quantitative research method and 
applying the correlational design chosen for this study. I explained in detail the rationale 
for selecting this quantitative approach versus qualitative or mixed methods and 
experimental or quasi-experimental designs. I explained my role as a researcher and 
addressed the need to remain unbiased, and ethical throughout the research process. Also 
provided are the population details in which I chose the sample. Along with the technique 
I used to collect, store, and analyze data, the internal and external validity concerns and 
methods of mitigation convey. In Section 3, I present the results of statistical analysis, 
along with an interpretation of the findings with applications to the hypothesis, research 
question, and social change. In Section 3, I recommend ideas for action, future research, 
and personal research reflections of this study, inclusive of a summary of conclusions.  
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Section 3: Application for Professional Practice and Implications for Change 
 The proper alignment of financial incentives for executives is critical to the 
survival of NPHs. In Section 1 of this study, I introduced the foundation of the study and 
the gap in current research that examines net community benefits expense. In Section 2, I 
described the steps performed to examine the relationships among the study variables. In 
section 3, I present the results of my research and explain how the findings may influence 
professional practice. The conclusion of this study focuses on implications for social 
change and reflections on the doctoral study process. 
Overview of Study 
 The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the 
relationship between financial performance as measured by ROA, change in net assets 
(profit), net community benefits expense, and executive compensation. With increasing 
costs and regulation of NPHs, boards of directors’ challenges include ensuring that 
executive compensation aligns with organizational goals (Brandes et al., 2015). Kolev et 
al. (2014) noted executive compensation alignment as a board strategy necessary for 
survival. Boards of directors are primary influencers of executive compensation strategies 
(Ben-Ner & Ren, 2013). 
 I collected data from NCCS, Guidestar, and the Center for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services. The independent variables for this study were (a) financial performance as 
measured by ROA, (b) change in net assets (profit), and (c) the total dollar amount of net 
community benefits expense. The independent controlling variable was ADC. The 
dependent variable for this study was executive compensation. The findings of this study 
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may provide boards of directors’ financial insight in creating executive compensation 
policies that align with organizational goals. When scrutinizing the relationship between 
the variables of this study, I determined that a statistically significant relationship did 
exist for the model; therefore, I rejected the null hypothesis and failed to reject the 
alternative hypothesis. ROA, net assets, and total community benefits expense were good 
tools when predicting executive compensation in 2013.  
Presentation of Findings 
Research Question and Hypotheses 
The research question was the following: What is the relationship between urban 
U.S. NPH financial performance as measured by ROA, change in net assets (profit), net 
community benefits expense, and executive compensation? The study included three 
independent variables: ROA, change in net assets (profit), and net community benefits 
expense. The independent controlling variable was average daily census, and the 
dependent variable was executive compensation. I conducted an in-depth examination of 
current literature before I developed the research question and hypothesis. 
 Ferri and Maber (2013) and Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn (2013) acknowledged 
the utility of regression analysis in their studies addressing executive compensation and 
company performance. Similarly, I used regression modeling to determine the extent to 
which relationships existed between the variables of this study. I used regression analysis 
for this study to examine relationships between the variables (a) ROA, (b) change in net 
assets (profit), (c) total community benefits expense, and (d) executive compensation. I 
framed the testing of variables in the following hypothesis:  
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Null hypothesis (H0): There is no statistically significant predictive relationship 
between (a) ROA, (b) change in net assets (profit), (c) net community benefits expense, 
and (d) executive compensation within the U.S. urban NPH industry. 
Alternative hypothesis (H1): There is a statistically significant predictive 
relationship between (a) ROA, (b) change in net assets (profit), (c) net community 
benefits expense, and (d) executive compensation within the U.S. urban NPH industry. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 After examining the IRS 990 reports to determine whether the financial results 
fairly represented results from continuing operations. I removed three financial reports 
because the results contained material one-time gains or losses that skewed the financial 
results. Table 1 depicts the descriptive statistics for the variables. The five most common 
titles of executives included vice president of fund development, physician, chief 
operating officer, president, and chief financial officer. 
Table 1 
  Statistics of Sample Mean and Sample Standard Deviation 
 M SD Min Max 
Average Executive 
Compensation ($) 
571,626 285,893 222,095 1,695,489 
ROA (%) 5.2 4.8 -4.82 21.81 
Net Income (Profit) ($) 42,327,915 53,088,057 -27,342,855 401,639,442 
Total Net Community 
Benefits Expense ($) 
41,550,196 35,371,949 5,499,381 267,170,077 
ADC 320 185 110 1346 
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To gain a further understanding of the relationship between variables, I completed 
a correlational matrix for all variables, as illustrated in Table 2. The table includes the 
Pearson correlation and one-tailed significance (p value). Although I did not use the 
correlational matrix to test my hypotheses, the results provided an understanding of the 
relationship among variables. All correlations were positive with the exception of the 
relationship between AEC and ROA. 
Table 2 
 
 Correlation Matrix  
 
 
AEC ROA Net Income 
(Profit) 
Net 
Community 
Benefits  
ADC 
Pearson 
Correlation 
AEC 1.000 -.061 .368 .441 .654 
ROA -.061 1.000 .571 .046 .046 
Net Income (Profit) .368 .571 1.000 .398 .398 
Net Community 
Benefits 
.441 .008 .411 1.000 .497 
ADC .654 .046 .398 .000 1.000 
AEC . .257 .000 .000 .000 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
ROA .257 . .000 .312 .465 
Net Income (Profit) .000 .000 . .000 .000 
Net Community 
Benefits  
.000 .456 .000 . .000 
ADC .000 .312 .000 .000 . 
AEC 117 117 117 117 117 
N 
ROA 117 117 117 117 117 
Net Income (Profit) 117 117 117 117 117 
Net Community 
Benefits  
117 117 117 117 117 
ADC 117 117 117 117 117 
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Assumptions Testing Results 
 Prior to testing the hypotheses, I examined the data for missing data, outliers, and 
homoscedasticity and linearity violations. While there were no missing data, I discovered 
and removed thee outliers from the initial sample of 120, resulting in a final sample of 
117 financial statements. I then inspected the data for homoscedasticity and linearity 
violations (Figure 1). The inspection indicated that none had occurred. Figures 2-5 show 
partial regression plots illustrating the effect of adding each variable to the regression 
model. 
 
 
Figure 1. 2013 scatterplot for residuals.  
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Figure 2. 2013 partial plot for ROA. 
 
Figure 3. 2013 partial plot for net income (profit). 
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Figure 4. 2013 partial plot for total net community benefits expense. 
 
Figure 5. 2013 partial plot for ADC. 
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 Using normal probability plots (P-P) of the standardized residuals, I did not detect 
violations of the normality assumption. Illustrated in Figure 6, the residual plotting is 
near the normal line. Because all residuals are close to the line, there is reason to believe 
that residuals are independent. There is no indication that autocorrelation occurs. 
 
 
Figure 6. Normal P-P plot of residual standards. 
As a further test of the data, I examined the potential for collinearity. As displayed 
in Table 3, all tolerance values were below 1.0 and all variance inflation factor (VIF) 
values exceeded 1.0. In addition, no correlations among independent variables were 
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greater than 0.7 (Table 2). As explained by Moore (2014), when statistical results fall 
within these benchmarks for tolerance, VIF, and correlation, the researcher can assume 
no violations of multicollinearity exist for the data. 
Table 3 
Collinearity Statistics 
Model Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)   
ROA .589 1.699 
Net Income (Profit) .464 2.155 
Net Community Benefits .652 1.534 
ADC .664 1.505 
 
Inferential Results 
 I piloted a linear regression model to determine if a relationship existed between 
the independent variables including ROA, change in net assets, and net community 
benefits expense with the dependent variable average executive compensation and. I used 
ADC as an independent controlling variable. The null hypothesis was that there was no 
significant predictive relationship between ROA, change in net assets, net community 
benefits expense, and executive compensation. The alternative hypothesis was that there 
is a significant predictive relationship between ROA, change in net assets, net community 
benefits expense, and executive compensation. 
 The model as a whole was able to significantly predict AEC, F (5,111) = 23.041, 
p = .000, R2 = .509. The R2 (.509) value indicated that approximately 51% of variations in 
AEC is accounted for by the linear combination of the predictor independent variables 
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(see tables 4-6 for model summary). In the final model, the relationship between change 
in net assets (beta= -.253, p=.004) and ROA (beta= .273, p=.006) with AEC was 
significant at the .05 level. Total net community benefits did not show a significant 
relationship with AEC (beta =.063, p=.449), which indicates that although a relationship 
does exist the relationship is not statistically significant. Additionally, Droby et al. (2015) 
noted that further t-test examination would result in erroneous conclusions. Thus, the 
regression coefficients located in Table 7 may lead to future research.  
My findings are similar to those produced by Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn 
(2013), Ferri and Maber (2013), Lin et al. (2013), and Hou, Priem, and Goranova (2014) 
who all found statistically significant relationships between executive compensation and 
company performance. The most surprising find is the negative correlation between ROA 
and AEC. Turner, Broom, Elliot, and Lee (2015) noted that NPHs often have restricted 
funding that limit managerial behaviors, and consequently may accrue to future 
managers. However, none of the previous research included ADC and net community 
benefits expenses are variables. That there was no relationship between net community 
benefit and AEC may suggest that boards of directors do not use metric to target 
executive compensation. To ensure an in-depth examination of data, I examined the 117 
hospitals, which represents 97.5% of the total proposed sample of 120 NPHs (Table 2). 
Although there was a statistically significance to the model, I can conclude that boards of 
directors’ will find the information useful as executive compensation packages align with 
hospital objectives. 
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Table 4 
Analysis of Variance 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 4.829E+12 5 9.658E+11 23.041 .000b 
Residual 4.652E+12 111 41914348193   
Total 9.481E+12 116    
a. Dependent Variable: Average Executive Compensation 
b. Predictors: (Constant), ADC, ROA, Total Net Community Benefits Expense, Net Income (Profit) 
 
 
Table 5 
Model Summary A 
Model Summaryc 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change 
F Change df1 
1 .714a .509 .487 204729.94 .509 23.041 5 
 
Table 6  
Model Summary B 
 
 Model Summary 
Model  
 Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson 
df2 Sig. F Change 
 
1 111a .000 1.849 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ADC, Total Net Community Benefits Expense, Net Income Profit 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Average Executive Compensation 
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Table 7 
Coefficients  
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
 
(Constant) 396337.12 61859.52  6.407 .000 
ROA -14976.47 5128.42 -.253 -2.920 .004 
Net Income Profit .001 .001 .273 2.800 .006 
Net Community Benefit .001 .001 .063 .760 .449 
ADC 875.14 126.26 .565 6.931 .000 
 
Applications to Professional Practice 
 The primary goal of this study was to close the gap in existing literature regarding 
predictive executive compensation and the performance of the company as measured by 
ROA, change in net assets (profit), and net community benefits expense while controlling 
for ADC. The purpose of this study was to determine the predictive nature of executive 
compensation on NPH performance. The findings of this study may be of significant 
practical utility to professionals, academic researchers, and people seeking to understand 
executive compensation of NPHs.  
 Academia may want to encompass and expand upon the contributions of this 
study via further examination of possible correlating executive compensation and NPH 
performance. The growing pools of NPH data, conjoined with various combinations may 
influence nonprofit performance (Bai, 2012; Pinho, Rodrigues, & Dibb, 2014). The 
results of this study offer a fresh perspective on NPH executive compensation and its 
relationship with net community benefits expense. 
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 Moreover, the results of this study may be key elements NPH boards of directors 
may use crafting executive compensation alignment strategies. NPH boards of directors 
may use incentives to align executive decisions with company goals (Bosse & Phillips, 
2014; Kistruck et al., 2013; Stanowski & Lynn, 2015). Though agency theory is 
applicable when creating incentive packages (Song et al., 2015), there still exists the 
possibility of executive motivation not aligning with NPH agenda (Galle & Walker, 
2014). 
Implications for Social Change 
 Maintaining IRS 501(c) (3) nonprofit status is imperative to NPH operations 
(Bhargava, & Manoli, 2015; U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2015). The implications of 
the study’s results could serve three potential purposes. The overall results indicated that 
net community benefits expense was not a great predictor of executive compensation. 
Nevertheless, the analysis also indicated a negative relationship between net community 
benefits expense and executive compensation. Thus, the opportunity exists for NPH 
governance committees’ to investigate the negative relationship, while potentially 
diverting additional funding to create more jobs in the communities in which they serve. 
Furthermore, lawmakers may find the results useful as they construct legislation that may 
increase NPH sustainability through various policies. Due to closures and mergers, 
politicians may want to assign a percentage of net community benefits expense based on 
NPH bed count, and ADC. Insurance companies may find the results useful for potential 
lowering of premiums.  
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Recommendations for Action 
The existence of the agency problem greatly influences the need for executive 
monitoring by the boards of directors (Dalton et al., 2007). The implications of results of 
this study may serve three future purposes. For boards of directors, the overall results 
indicated net community benefits relate to executive compensation. While the IRS 
mandates net community benefits expense as a requirement to maintain 501(c) (3) status, 
compensation package alignments may include maintaining such requirements. Thus, 
retaining non-profit status enables the structure to remain as is without restructuring to 
compete with for-profit entities. Secondly, NPH boards of directors may include various 
metrics in executive salary packages such as ADC.  
 As a final point, academia, legislators, and scholar-practitioners may use the 
results of this study to align governance policies in which community job creation occur. 
Legislators may see a need to raise or lower the required community benefits expense 
requirement. Scholar-practitioners may use the results of this study as a basis to explore 
other areas of NPH expenditures and categories. I intend to publish the results of this 
study in the ProQuest/UMI dissertation database, pursue academic journal publications, 
and discuss results at academic conferences. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
 In this study, I examined the relationship between executive compensation, ROA, 
return on assets (profit), net community benefits expense, and ADC. Future researchers 
may want to conduct a similar study examining multiple years focusing on those 
hospitals with a minimum of 500 patient beds. Future researchers may also wish to 
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examine the numerous variable pools for relationships existing with the control variable 
ADC, as there may be a relationship existing between change in net assets and ADC. 
Additionally, scholars in the future may want examine the relationship between executive 
compensation and negative ROA. 
Reflections 
 My primary goal of this study was to understand executive compensation and its 
relationship to NPH performance. I encountered numerous obstacles including the data 
collection, analyzing, and interpretation of results. The NCCC, Guidestar, and CMS 
websites were user-friendly but required the user to know their data needs. I spent 
countless hours downloading the wrong data. However, once figuring out how CMS 
catalogs their data, it became a much easier process. It was difficult to find the average 
daily census for some of the hospitals, as maybe 20 of them did not post their total 
inpatient days online. Although I reached out to many via phone calls and electronically, 
very few responded within the timeframe needed for this study. I later discovered that 
most annual reports include inpatient days for the reported period. The experience I 
gained working with data will be valuable to me as I continue this research after 
graduation. 
Summary and Study Conclusions 
 The main purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to investigate 
executive compensation and its relationship to NPH performance. Explicitly, the first 
goal was to determine if a statistically significant relationship existed between executive 
compensation, ROA, change in net assets (profit), and net community benefits expense 
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while using ADC as a controlling variable. I examined the relationship using a linear 
regression model and a sample of 117 NPHs. 
 The findings revealed that there is a statistically significant linear relationship 
existing because all the p-values were less than that of the alpha of .05. As a result, I 
rejected the null hypothesis H0, and failed to reject the alternative hypothesis H1. Thus, the 
findings of a statistically significant relationship may indicate NPHs may be slowly 
implementing net community benefits expense clauses into executive compensation 
packages.   
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